The eruption of the fundamentalist separatist insurgency has exploded many myths in relation to Kashmir. For nearly five decades Kashmiris were described as ‘unique’ people, who rejected the two-nation theory of Jinnah. The ethnic-cleansing of Kashmiri Hindus from the only Muslim-majority province of India has debunked the claim that Kashmir was the crown of Indian secularism, or a secular oasis in the communally torn subcontinent. Indian political leadership, failed in formulating the nation’s stakes in Kashmir. The stakes could be either strategic or ideological. By conceding the strategic northern areas in 1947, Indian leadership had conveyed that the stakes were not strategic. Successive Central governments connived in the policies of the Kashmir-Centric state leadership, which destabilized Kashmir Hindus in particular and Hindus in general in J&K.

For the nation stakes were always clear. Strategically Kashmir formed the northern frontier of India and ideologically active pluralism in Kashmir strengthened secular nation-building in India. Congress leaderships perspective for advocating accession of Jammu and Kashmir with India was however convoluted. Congress leaders had rejected the two-nation theory but accepted the partition. Accession of Kashmir to India for Congress leaders was a matter of pure expediency on three counts. One it deflected the criticism that Congress had accepted partition of the country on two-nation theory basis. Secondly, it allowed Nehru to fight his factional battles within Congress to outmanoeuver Hindu nationalist lobby of Sardar Patel, BC Roy and GB Pant. Thirdly, Congress wanted to cultivate Muslims as a votebank. Muslim minority in UP and Bihar had strongly supported the Pakistan movement. Thus concessions for these Muslims could be wrested only if compulsions flowing from accession of Kashmir to India were cited. Glorifying Sheikh Abdullah and Kashmiris for their nationalism and secularism became a matter of expediency for the Indian political leadership. Clean chit to the Kashmir political leaders encouraged separatist blackmail and emboldened them for pursuing destabilization process of Kashmiri Hindus in Valley and people of Jammu and Ladakh. In early years when such great leaders like Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru tried to focus Nehru’s attention on the destabilization schemes of Sheikh Abdullah’s government, he snubbed him saying, “I have not done accession for Kashmiri Pandits.” The expediency of Congress leadership was also exploited by alienated westernized secular Indian elite to fight its turf battles with those forces who wanted positive engagement with the genius of Indian civilisation. Secularists’ argument that Kashmir was the crown of Indian secularism rested on three arguments.

i) Sheikh Abdullah repudiated two-nation theory by acceding to India;

ii) National Conference saved Hindus from virtual destruction in the wake of tribal raid of 1947. Sheikh Abdullah built the foundations of secularism and Kashmiriat;

iii) and absence of communal violence in post-1947.

Close scrutiny of the historical details exposes the flawed basis of the secularist argument. Rebuffing of the two-nation theory: Historical data, which has since become available clearly points that Sheikh Abdullah’s role during accession has been exaggerated. Nehru’s strong dislike towards Hari Singh was responsible for Hari Singh’s delay in making up mind on accession to India. There is documentary evidence that Hari Singh had been pressing Indian government hard for accession since September 15, 1947. Nehru’s priorities were abdication by Maharaja in favour of Sheikh Abdullah rather than accession. After analyzing the declassified material, late Dr NN Raina, the father of communist movement in Kashmir remarked that “Hari Singh’s role needs to be rewritten”. Role of Sheikh Abdullah in 1947 reflects expediency rather than any conviction to rebuff Muslim nationalism for a larger Indian nationalism. Since 1943 NC had been trying to mend fences with Jinnah. The essence of the conflict between NC and Jinnah lay in refusal of Muslim nationalism as represented by Muslim League to accommodate local Muslim nationalism as articulated by National Conference. This antagonism had nothing to do with supposed rejection of two-nation theory by NC in favour of secular nationalism.

Jinnah’s rejection of NC’s claim as popular party of Kashmiri Muslims in favour of Muslim conference left little options for Sheikh Abdullah. Even then NC continued to hold olive branch to Jinnah and Muslim League. Krishan Dev Sethi, veteran communist leader narrates in his memoirs that NC tried to rechristen itself as Muslim conference in 1945 to gain the goodwill of the Muslim League. During ‘Quit Kashmir’ agitation Sheikh Abdullah’s slogan was not accession to India but “Freedom before accession”. Sheikh Abdullah made the last effort to win the confidence of Jinnah, when he sent his two lieutenants Bakshi and Sadiq to Pakistan. The purpose of their visit was not to discuss the quantum of accession but to seek a commitment that Muslim League recognised NC and Sheikh Abdullah as main spokesperson of Kashmiri Muslims. Egoistic and overconfident Jinnah refused to accommodate Sheikh Abdullah and paid the price. Sardar Shoukat Hayat Khan admits that Bakshi-Sadiq mission was mismanaged. Jinnah and Sheikh Abdullah hated each other. Both were autocrats. Jinnah left no options for Sheikh, who saw for himself no future in Pakistan dominated by Jinnah and Muslim League. He even knew of a secret Pak plan to kidnap him. Not very confident of India accepting accession, he was reconciled to a state of permanent political exile in India.

Sheikh Abdullah, had already despatched his family to Indore (reports say in the same aircraft in which the Maharani of the state travelled around 24 October, 1947). Sheikh as a mature politician had an elaborate game-plan for his rehabilitation. The first step of it was to prevent Kashmir from being annexed by Pakistan. Annexation by Pakistan would seal his future for all times to come. Tribal raid left him the only one option available i.e. accession to India. Once the accession had been signed and the die was cast, Sheikh began unfolding his version of two nation theory. After Jinnah’s demise Sheikh tried to rebuild the bridges with the Muslim League through the instrumentality of Aga Khan. Sheikh also started cultivating pro-Pakistani section of Kashmiri Muslim bureaucracy. Justice Shahmiri was asked to head the committee set up to initiate dialogue with Indian leaders on Kashmir’s constitutional relationship with India. He made no secret of ‘great’ divergence with Congress Muslim stalwarts like Maulana Azad and Rafi Ahmad Kidwai and tried to undermine their prestige.

Sheikh raised the bogey of communal representation in Central services to strengthen secessionist tendencies among the Kashmiris. Sheikh’s arrest in 1953, was not only supported but actually implemented by Maulana Azad Rafi Kidwai, Dr KM Ashraf and ZA Ahmed. They understood well what Sheikh’s betrayal meant to millions of Indian Muslims still not out of traumatic conditions of the aftermath of partition. As early as December 1947 (barely three months after the accession had been signed, Ram Manohar Lohia had, in a sensational report, told Nehru, how the Sheikh was nursing separatist tendencies. This report had been passed on by Nehru to his two senior Muslim cabinet members. Had Sheikh Abdullah’s support for accession been genuine, secularisation of Kashmiri Muslim society and its emotional integration with Indian people would have been his priority. Sheikh rather insisted on separate identity for Kashmiri Muslims and demanded Article 370 with right to secession to reinforce it. Where did the need of seeking this reaffirmationarise when the Indian constitution provided all the necessary guarantees. Pt. Prem Nath Bazaz commented on this, says, “If religious nationalism is to be a political creed, it is clear that Kashmiri Muslims will one day prefer Muslim nationalists or league to Hindu nationalism of Congress”. From 1953 onwards, the Sheikh started the main separatist organisation called Plebiscite Front, which played the crucial role in building the separatist psyche among Kashmiris.

Not in vain did his official biographer state in a seminar in 1989 that “If Sheikh Sahib had been alive today, he would have been in the jail”.

(To be concluded)