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BOOK REVIEW
Demilitarize or
Perish
By Chanakya Sen
A Review of
Rethinking the National Security of
Pakistan by Ahmad Faruqui
Always trust an economist to prick balloons of national security
floated by militarists. Economic consultant Ahmad Faruqui's commentary
on demilitarizing Pakistan offers an alternative vision for priming
human development, the road that rulers in Islamabad never took.
Published when generals are yet again preferred instruments of Western
intervention in Pakistan, this book warns of dire consequences if new
paths are not hewn.
A Faustian bargain
Faruqui's central thesis is that most of Pakistan's socio-economic
problems originate from the heavy emphasis on national defense and
military spending. Pakistan's unconditional support for the US's "war
against terrorism" after September 11, 2001 has augmented this lopsided
stress. President General Pervez Musharraf has been handed "an enduring
rationale for continuing as president under Kelsen's law of necessity
that has served all prior military rulers". (p xix). He is less inclined
to take any major initiatives to pursue peace with India. Military
expenditure continues to absorb the lion's share of the government
budget and no major overhaul of Pakistan's military organization is
likely. The endemic problem of military dominance in Pakistan has been
perpetuated with the mutual embrace of the West and Musharraf.
More harm than good has accrued when Musharraf short-sold Pakistan to
the US. To prevent the "Islamic bomb" from falling into religious
terrorist hands, the American 15th Marine Expeditionary unit is ready to
"neutralize" Pakistan's weapons of mass destruction even at the cost of
engaging Pakistani troops. The arrest of Pakistani nuclear scientists
for passing know-how to al-Qaeda was done to please the US Federal
Bureau of Investigation. Changes in the Pakistan army high command and
the Inter-Services Intelligence were carried out to curry favor with the
Central Intelligence Agency. India has succeeded in throwing flashlights
on terrorist training infrastructure in Pakistani Kashmir. The victory
of the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan is a major setback to Pakistan
due to the former's closeness to Iran and India. Pakistan's economy is
deteriorating, with sliding per capita incomes lower than 1%, and
foreign economic assistance evaporating after the Taliban were dislodged
from Afghanistan.
Musharraf's decision to ally with the US turns out to be a Faustian
bargain, not a bright tactical move. It is similar to the 1999 Kargil
war with India planned by Musharraf. Initially praised as "an act of
military brilliance", Pakistan lost both the political and military
battle for Kargil. It had to withdraw in humiliating circumstances since
"the world chose to accept the Indian version of events". (p 16)
History of militarism
Pakistan's governance travails stem from dictators who are "specialists
in violence rather than in economics". (p 19) Small cabals have acquired
disproportionate organizational and collusive power under successive
military regimes. The landed oligarchy, the bureaucracy and the jihadis
are the main beneficiaries of Pakistan's "political economy of defense".
(Ayesha Jalal) Their fortunes have been peaking through policies
exacerbating inter-class and inter-regional inequalities.
General Ayub Khan nurtured a class of robber barons with gigantic
concentration of wealth in a handful of families. West Pakistan's per
capita income was 61% higher than the East's under Ayub. Zulfiqar Ali
Bhutto, a feudal lord himself, was unable to rise above his roots. He
transferred resources from public enterprises to private individuals and
income distribution worsened under his so-called socialist tenure.
General Zia ul-Haq mass-appointed retired and serving army officers to
top public sector positions and allowed one fifth of the US$3.2 billion
American aid for Afghanistan to be pocketed by the military-civil
service elites. Benazir Bhutto doled out franchises to thugs and
convicted murderers and triggered a new arms race with India due to her
respect for the Pakistani military's "autonomy". Nawaz Sharif, Zia's
protege, misused public funds for favoritism and kickbacks and followed
his mentor's promotion of orthodox militancy.
Musharraf's coup in 1999 occurred when "the army's corporate interests
were threatened". (p 35) He has named manifold ex-generals as diplomats
and many senior-serving officers to civilian duties for which they have
no core competency. He has not touched the lucrative contracts and
sinecures of the defense coteries and has failed to rein in religious
militias waging jihad.
Misreading India
Pakistan's present and past national security strategies are premised on
fear of being reabsorbed into India. The Pakistan army has convinced
many citizens that India never reconciled itself to the partition of
1947. To counter this perceived Indian threat militarily, "no economic
sacrifice is judged to be too much". (p 42) Pakistan's claim to Kashmir
is the main legitimating potion of its ruling class and the hawks in its
security establishment. This obsession has misbegotten four costly wars
and countless acts of subversion that proved fruitless.
Pakistan's military planners have projected India as "a pushover
adversary that is cowardly because the Hindu has no stomach for a
fight". (p 44) They have raised very high expectations about the
superiority of Pakistan's armed forces, illusions repeatedly shattered
by defeats. In spite of enjoying tactical successes, Pakistan has
consistently failed to achieve strategic objectives in wars with India.
Often, Islamabad has "completely misunderstood Indian intentions and
capabilities" and jumped the gun with hubris and folly. In 1971, General
Niazi believed that India would merely conduct a minor incursion into
East Pakistan (to become Bangladesh) to set up a puppet regime, though
Indian responses to provocation have always been aggressive, like those
of other states of similar power and size in the international system.
Failures in the higher direction of war have been matched by diplomatic
fiascos and leadership blunders. Pakistan expects its foreign allies to
bail it out of difficult situations against India, but these hopes have
rarely materialized. In the Kargil war, China, the vaunted "perpetual
ally", did not support Islamabad owing to fear of Islamic extremism.
Counting on China as a counterweight to India is also chimerical because
"the Indians have made it plain that they will not be routed a second
time and intend to return any Chinese 'lesson' in kind". (p 90)
Nuclear fallacies
Pakistan's advocacy of nuclear deterrence is meaningless since it has
not capped its program after developing a few atomic bombs. In the year
following its nuclear tests of 1998, Pakistan had to increase defense
spending by 10%, nullifying the publicized benefits of a "nuclear
dividend". Nothing changed in the day-to-day life of common Pakistanis,
even though nuclear scientists and generals commercialized weapons of
mass destruction for personal gain. Cash-strapped Pakistan is incapable
of matching the Indian increases in defense budgets, but the vanity of
weaponizing "even if the people eat grass" (Z A Bhutto) has not receded.
Pakistan's nuclear program cost an estimated $10 billion up to 2001 and
set back development indices by more than years. Post-nuclear US
sanctions caused Pakistan's economy to suffer a gross domestic product
fall of 2.9%. The exorbitant opportunity costs of Pakistan's nuclear
white elephant have actually diminished the country's national security.
Retrenchment strategies
The solution to Pakistan's security deficit suggested by Faruqui is to
balance its economic resources with strategic ambitions. What is needed
is a "lean and mean military organization, without becoming a drain on
the national treasury and undermining the non-military dimensions of
security". (p 115) The comparative experience of Israel, which depends
on reservists for defending territorial integrity, is a lesson. To
defend Pakistan against external aggression, a force level of 300,000
troops is enough, ie half of the present strength. Demobilization can be
carried out by offering golden handshakes and compensation packages for
converting swords into ploughshares. Small force levels do not imply
weak defense.
At present, Pakistan is incurring a price tag of $110 million a year for
pumping the insurgency in Indian Kashmir and thereby earning the ire of
the international community. Faruqui prescribes a more active "third
party catalyst" role for the US to provide incentives for peace over
Kashmir, though how a superpower interested in running off democratic
India against China can be expected to be an honest broker over Kashmir
is left for the reader's imagination. Faruqui's reading of post-Cold War
realities and US-China equation are confusing.
Economic aid, debt write-offs and conversion to zero-interest loans are
also recommended to encourage defense spending cuts in Pakistan and
India. Faruqui makes assumptions that Indian security is purely
Pakistan-centric by adducing two-country game theory models to prove
that economic diplomacy works. Bilateralizing concentric multilateral
threat perceptions is too simplistic.
Faruqui's proposals for reforming the Pakistani military are on firmer
ground. To improve national security by lifting the people's confidence
in the military, the latter should provide a transparent analysis of its
fiscal expenditures. Pakistan's defense spending has been free from
scrutiny or audit, thanks to the guiding philosophy of "defense for the
sake of defense". Only two lines in the official budget (defense
administration and defense services) represent the huge military expense
bill, with no explanation of what these two items stand for. Pakistan
should switch from exorbitant "offensive defense" to "defensive
dominance" strategies that involve civilian participation. The military
must formalize rigorous self-evaluation of combat effectiveness and be
willing to accept failings.
Do or die
Pakistan's poor economic situation is linked intrinsically with faulty
defense and foreign policies. Faruqui offers Pakistani leaders the
example of Deng Xiaoping, who converted China's foreign policy of
confrontation into one of economic cooperation. Pakistan's savings and
investment ratios are among the lowest in the world, mainly due to
defense spending and corruption, both severe drains. It spends 6% of its
gross domestic product on defense, while health and education stagnate
at 1% and 2%.
Faruqui argues for correct, accurate and realistic threat evaluations,
not exaggerated and unrealistic ones. These would also bring home the
futility of massive arms importing and free resources for public
welfare. Military spending in Asia as a whole has declined from the end
of the Cold War and helped power investment and per capita incomes in
the long run. Disarmament is feasible and practical, as examples from
both developing and developed countries reveal. For Pakistan, which is
on the edge of the precipice, there is no choice but to pragmatically
take a leaf from Deng's famous dictum that strength is primarily
economic.
But for a disappointing reliance on International Monetary Fund and
World Bank formulas for poverty alleviation, Faruqui's study is a fine
blend of strategic revision and economic prognosis. The million-dollar
question is whether Musharraf reads this honest reappraisal of what
Pakistan requires to be really secure.
Rethinking the National
Security of Pakistan. The Price of Strategic Myopia by Ahmad Faruqui.
Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot. ISBN: 0-7546-1497-2. Price US$79.95,190
pages.
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