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THE KASHMIR DIALOGUE
G.
PARTHASARATHY
Columnist and former Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan
On October 25, 2004, General Pervez Musharraf 'floated' some 'new ideas'
for moving ahead on the Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) issue in the ongoing
dialogue process between India and Pakistan. He called for 'identifying'
seven distinct regions in J&K on both sides of the Line of Control (LoC).
Two regions that he alluded to are Pakistan Occupied Kashmir and the
Northern Areas now under Pakistani control. The remaining five regions
on the Indian side he was alluding to appear to include the Jammu Region
(Hindu majority), the Poonch Region and the Valley of Kashmir (Sunni
Muslim dominated), the Kargil Sector (Shia Muslim dominated) and the
Ladakh Region (Buddhist majority). General Musharraf spoke of
'demilitarizing' these regions. He added that they should either be
granted 'independence', placed under 'Joint Indo-Pakistan control,' or
under 'UN Mandate'. Faced with criticism in Pakistan for not insisting
on UN Resolutions, he hastened to clarify that all he had done was to
float a few trial balloons.
The Manmohan Singh Government in New Delhi was placed in an awkward
situation by General Musharraf's 'loud thinking'. Musharraf's proposals
were very close to those put forward a few years earlier by the
Washington based Kashmir Study Group headed by Kashmiri business tycoon
Farookh Katwari, who was encouraged by the Clinton Administration in his
efforts. Katwari's proposals sought to divide J&K on religious lines and
to secure a semi-independent status for the Kashmir Valley. There were
few takers for these suggestions in New Delhi. Sensing that he had no
option but to respond to General Musharraf's 'trial balloons', Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh set out India's position in unambiguous terms
when visiting Srinagar on November 17, 2004. Dr. Singh asserted: "I have
made it quite clear that any redrawing of the international border is
something which is not going to be acceptable to us… Any proposal which
smacks of a further division of our country on the basis of religion is
not going to be acceptable to us… Within these two limits we are ready
to look into any new proposals".
While the Pakistan Foreign Office predictably termed Dr. Manmohan
Singh's response as disappointing and repeatedly kept urging
'flexibility', the presently unbridgeable gap between India's bottom
line on the issue of J&K and Pakistan's expectations came into clear
focus. It is obvious that no amount of diplomatic sophistry can bridge
the vast divide between the two countries on what Pakistan calls the
'core issue'. Any possibility of a 'solution' to the Kashmir issue in
the foreseeable future can thus be ruled out. The question that arises
is how the two countries can evolve a framework which enables them to
live with these differences, while demonstrating that tensions are being
reduced and that ordinary Kashmiris are proceeding with their lives with
safety, dignity and economic progress. Pakistan can derive some
satisfaction from the fact that it has got New Delhi to discuss issues
pertaining to J&K in a sustained manner thirty two years after the Simla
Agreement was signed. New Delhi, in turn, can now be satisfied with the
fact that this dialogue is taking place after a public pledge by General
Musharraf that he would not allow territory under Pakistan's control to
be used for terrorist activities against India. Pakistan also realizes
that its quest for third party mediation has reached a dead end in world
capitals that matter - Washington, Moscow, London, Paris and Beijing.
There now appears to be some recognition in Islamabad that while it must
keep harping on words like 'core issue' and 'solution' while referring
to J&K, what it can practically hope to achieve for the present is an
unfreezing of the status quo in J&K, while simultaneously
discussing a wide range of issues to reduce tensions and enhance
confidence between the two countries. Given the predominance of the Army
establishment in determining policies towards India, even a rational
economic thinker like Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz has no option but to
place a long list of conditions to normalization of trade and economic
relations. But Shaukat Aziz has indicated that such relations could
expand as negotiations for a South Asian Free Trade Area (scheduled to
be launched in January 2006) pick up momentum. One hopes that credible
security guarantees will be obtained from Iran before the gas pipeline
project through Pakistan is finally inked. This project can move ahead
once the prices are agreed upon and India completes arrangements for
alternate modes of transportation, should supplies be cut.
A wide range of issues have been discussed under the 'Composite Dialogue
Process' between India and Pakistan in recent months. The Foreign
Secretaries of the two countries have met twice. Foreign Minister Kasuri
has visited India and External Affairs Minister Natwar Singh was in
Pakistan last month. Despite these meetings, differences remain over
hydroelectric projects like Baglihar and Kishenganga in J&K, with
Pakistan either seeking World Bank intervention where its demands are
not met, or stalling a mutually acceptable solution, as in the Tulbul
Navigation project, despite India stopping construction work in
deference to Pakistani demands in 1988. While there has been an
inclination on both sides to remain inflexible on many issues, the most
notable achievement has been the agreement to establish a bus service
between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad last month. There is also to be a bus
service between Amritsar and Lahore and for the first time in 30 years
Pakistan has agreed to reopen the rail link between Munabao in Rajasthan
and Khokrapar in Sind. A human dimension is now being given to the
relationship with politicians, judges, lawyers, professionals and
business men traveling across the border. But these measures can be best
implemented only if the existing visa regime is liberalized and
Consulates to issue visas are reopened in Karachi and Mumbai.
At the strategic military level, the pace of normalization has been
could have been faster. The two countries agreed during the Lahore
Summit in February 1999 to conclude agreements for prior notification of
missile tests and to avoid incidents at sea. These agreements are yet to
be concluded. Contacts between the Directors General of Military
Operations and the Foreign Secretaries are being upgraded. Mutual
confidence could be further enhanced if there are direct links between
the Air Operations Directorates of the two Air Forces. Further while
India has spelt out its nuclear doctrine to Pakistan, there has been no
reciprocity on this score. It is evident that Pakistan wishes to
maintain a posture of ambiguity on its nuclear doctrine in order to
constantly hold out the threat of Kashmir being a 'nuclear flashpoint'
to the international community, though this threat carries little
credibility presently. New Delhi recognizes that while the Pakistani
nuclear deterrent is 'India specific', Pakistan is not going to get into
a suicide mode of using nuclear weapons unless its very survival is at
stake.
There are still a number of areas where cooperation, confidence and
contacts between India and Pakistan can be expanded. India should ensure
that a large number of tourists from Pakistan are welcomed in J&K
throughout the tourist season. Srinagar should be expeditiously made
into an international airport. Bus routes between Kargil and Skardu and
Jammu and Sialkot are other measures that can be taken soon. Moves need
also to be initiated for free trade across the LoC. But amidst interest
in such measures a degree of caution needs to be injected. Because of
threats posed to American interests and his own security, General
Musharraf has curbed the activities of two ISI supported Pakistani
groups, the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM)
and the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM)
in J&K. But other groups like the
Lashkar e Taiba continue to operate with support from the ISI. While
overall casualties and infiltration levels have gone down, Pakistan
based terrorist groups are now pointedly targeting vulnerable security
forces installations, Government offices and politicians who do not toe
Islamabad's line in Jammu and Kashmir. The infrastructure for promoting
terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir still remains intact. Pakistan is also
arming and training insurgent groups operating in India's northeast with
active cooperation from the Khaleda Zia Government in Bangladesh.
New Delhi appears to believe that it can and should move ahead on the
process of normalization even if General Musharraf does not fully keep
the promise he made on January 6, 2004, to end all support for terrorism
on Pakistan controlled territory. It, however, remains to be seen how
the military establishment in Pakistan acts in coming months on its
policies of wanting to 'weaken India from within' and 'bleeding India
with a thousand cuts'. The picture will become clearer when the winter
snows melt in the Himalayas.
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