J&K: Withering Roses - The Peace Process Melts Down
Praveen Swami
Special Correspondent, Frontline
It is perhaps a sign of
the extraordinary desperation that has gripped policy-making on Jammu
and Kashmir (J&K) that the blossoming of every single rose is heralded
as evidence that summer has arrived. The unremitting violence that has
followed Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee's August visit to Srinagar
has shown yet again that roses can be easily cut down, or can simply
wither away in the relentless heat of the real world. Amidst the usual
hand-wringing provoked by the violence, however, few have asked the real
question that needs to be addressed: just why has peace-making proved so
difficult a business in Jammu and Kashmir?
One answer, perhaps, is that peace making is often founded on false
premises and half-truth. Much of the early-summer peace initiative was
based on the assumption that Chief Minister Mufti Mohammad Sayeed's
'Healing Touch' agenda had succeeded in starting to build a working
civil-society consensus against violence. 'Healing Touch' optimists
claimed there had been a 'marked reduction' in violence since the
People's Democratic Party (PDP)-led alliance had come to power. This was
variously attributed to Sayeed's programme of prisoner releases, his
campaigns against corruption, and the realisation among secessionist
organisations that they could find a place within mainstream political
practice and discourse.
In fact, the figures show, there was no really meaningful decline
in violence. If one considers the
total numbers of killings
as an index, the events of this winter closely mirror those of 2001 and
2002, slacking off in the winter and then escalating as spring and
summer set in. There was, in fact, a far larger drop in killings in the
summer of 2002, compared with 2001, than anything the 'Healing Touch'
achieved. This could, perhaps, be attributed to the impact of Operation
Parakram, the massive military mobilisation set in place after Jaish-e-Mohammad
(JeM)
terrorists stormed India's Parliament building in December 2001.
Operation Parakram, it could be argued, established a threshold level
for violence, sustained since by a variety of factors, ranging from
United States of America pressure on Pakistan, and a realisation in that
country's military establishment of the potential costs of a near-war
situation.
A second myth is that political life in Jammu and Kashmir has started to
normalise. In fact, political discourse there remains distinctly
abnormal. Consider, for example, the giant billboard outside
Srinagar airport, welcoming any tourists who might arrive. Set against
the backdrop of Kashmir in autumn, the billboard bears the visages of
Prime Minister Vajpayee and Chief Minister Sayeed. Nowhere else in the
country would a Congress-supported Chief Minister be so eager to
advertise his warm relationship with the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).
Nor, of course, would the BJP be keen to share space with the leader of
the party committed to releasing terrorists from jail, and to dialogue
with Islamist secessionist groups like the Hizb-ul-Mujaheddin (HM).
Sadly for both these politicians - the twin poles of the peace process
initiated in March - things aren't quite going according to plan. For
one, there are few tourists to see the billboard. Hotels and houseboats
emptied after a string of bombings and suicide-squad attacks executed to
mark the Prime Minister's visit to Srinagar. Underlying this is a larger
political problematic. "Our doors are open", the Prime Minister said in
Srinagar, "to all those, who reject militancy and extreme positions and
wish to play a constructive role in taking Jammu and Kashmir forward on
the high road of peace and rapid development." This was of a piece with
his past position, notably articulated during the Ramzan ceasefire of
2000-2001, when the Union Government sought to engage elements within
the Hizb-ul-Mujaheddin politically.
For secessionist groups, armed or purely political, this position is
simply inadequate. For one, the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC)
head, Maulvi Abbas Ansari, has repeatedly rejected dialogue with the
Union Government's official mediator on Jammu and Kashmir, N.N. Vohra.
The APHC leaders believe their legitimacy would be undermined unless New
Delhi negotiates with them at the highest political level, acknowledging
the secessionists as representatives of a de-facto nation. With
general elections on the horizon, the BJP simply cannot afford to make
such a large concession. Indeed, it is profoundly unlikely that any
political dispensation in New Delhi could do so in the foreseeable
future.
Matters are further compromised by the running battle within the
Hurriyat Conference. On September 7, Syed Ali Shah Geelani leader of a
faction within the Jamaat-e-Islami, which has emerged as the Hurriyat's
arch-foe, called for a parallel meeting of the Hurriyat's General
Council to chalk out the organisation's course of action. The next day,
12 members of the 23-member General Council elected a four-member body
chaired by Muslim League leader Massarat Alam, a long-standing Geelani
supporter recently released from jail by the PDP Government, as a
parallel Hurriyat Executive. Centrists and Islamists are thus divided
down the middle, and a bitter leadership feud is underway.
On top of it all, the Hurriyat centrists are increasingly finding
themselves in confrontation with armed Islamist groups. Prior to
Vajpayee's visit, the Hurriyat sought to avoid calling for a shutdown of
shops and businesses, a ritual practice when major Indian leaders visit
Srinagar. Geelani, however, issued a call, and was followed in quick
time by the Islamabad-based council of fourteen terrorist groups, the
Muttahida (United) Jehad Council (MJC).
The MJC attacked the Hurriyat centrists for having gone soft on New
Delhi, a position that was also adopted by the LeT and JeM. The Hurriyat
was then forced to issue a call for a general strike. Hemmed in by
pressure from armed groups and Islamists, then, the Hurriyat centrists
are as unable as New Delhi to make major concessions.
It is profoundly unlikely that any short-term means can be found to
break the logjam. The United States of America is mired down in Iraq,
and South Asian concerns have largely disappeared from its foreground
consciousness. The situation is unlikely to change until President
George Bush is either re-elected, or a successor takes his place with
four years in hand. In the meanwhile, all players in J&K have an
interest in using the time available to strengthen their positions. The
available data suggests Pakistan, will continue singing the same tune it
did until 2001, albeit at a slightly lowered pitch. Violence, sadly,
will continue to be the principal medium of political discourse in J&K
for some time to come.
What, then, might New Delhi's policy establishment do? It could, for
one, reject a third myth: that peace-making and war-making stand in
binary opposition. New Delhi bureaucrats often treat security issues as
something sundered from the political process, rather than as an organic
part of the search for solutions. Unless the security establishment can
find creative means to make both ordinary people and their
representatives secure, it is unlikely that a meaningful move towards
peace can even begin. The killings of one-time terrorists turned
pro-India militia leaders, Mohammad Yusuf Parrey and Javed Ahmad Shah,
has signalled to potential fence-crossers that India is unable to look
after its own. In turn, the de-escalation of aggressive
counter-terrorist operations as part of the 'Healing Touch' programme
has allowed terrorist groups to reassert their influence in rural
Kashmir. Recruitment of local cadre has, by all accounts, picked up,
notwithstanding the construction of a broad peace consensus.
Politicians - the recent resignation of Jammu and Kashmir Agriculture
Minister Abdul Aziz Zargar is a case in point - have learned the obvious
lesson from this situation. On the face of it, Zargar has committed no
crime - or at least none not common to many residents of rural J&K.
Chand Usman Khan - a terrorist accused in the Akshardham attack in
Gujarat on September 24, 2002 - confessed that meetings to plan the
outrage were held in Zargar's village home in the Anantnag district. The
Minister had, however, left his residence in response to terrorism
twelve years ago. There is no allegation that Zargar knew of either the
meetings or their substance; but it is also true that he seems to have
done nothing to ask the police or army to liberate his village from
terrorist control. Zargar, like much of the ruling PDP, benefited
significantly from terrorist support in last year's elections. His rival
from the Noorabad constituency, Sakina Itoo, was repeatedly targeted by
terrorists during the election campaign; Zargar was not. Terrorists
through southern Kashmir told voters to support the PDP, and National
(NC) Conference candidates suffered as a result.
The malaise is not restricted to the PDP. A Pakistani terrorist recently
arrested in Poonch, Naim Khan, told his interrogators that a local NC
legislator had paid protection money to his organisation, the
Lashkar-e-Toiba. Hurriyat centrists - witness the case of assassinated
leader Abdul Gani Lone - have also discovered the cost of bucking the
jehadi fiat. Politicians, quite naturally, have learned that it is
best to make their peace with those who wield the guns, rather than to
strive for a genuine peace that excludes these elements. This is the
core of the peace paradox in Jammu and Kashmir - a problem whose
solution is the precondition to a successful peace process.
Courtesy:
South Asia Terrorism Portal |
