Whither Kashmir
Peace Process: International Jehad vs. A Soft Nation
Subodh Atal, Ph. D.
50 Years of Freefall
Down the Fundamentalist Path
The general antecedents of the "Kashmir Dispute" are well
known to many international observers who follow South Asian politics. A
half-century old standoff continues into the year 2001. Pakistan's quest
to snatch the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir is sold to the rest of
the world as the unfinished business of the 1947 Partition of India.
While most states followed their religious leanings, Jammu and Kashmir,
ruled by the Hindu maharaja Hari Singh, opted for India after Pakistan
orchestrated an invasion to force its hand. The Pakistani invaders
settled for the one-third of the state that they had occupied, driving
out Hindus and pro-Indian Muslims. During the half century since,
Pakistan has settled Punjabi Muslims in Kashmiri territory occupied by
it, driving down the Kashmiri-speaking population to a negligible
number. On the other hand, India, keeping true to its secular nature,
accorded a special status to the state, embodied in Article 370. The
article prevents people from the rest of India from settling in or
freely carrying out business in the state. It also allows the state to
ignore equal protection of minorities as enshrined in the Indian
constitution.
Kashmiri Pandits – Caught in The Islamic Vise
A result of this special treatment of the state was a socio-economic
disaster for minorities, especially Hindus in Kashmir valley between
1948-1989. Over half the million strong population of indigenous Kashmir
Pandits fled to other parts of India as valley Muslims converted their
status into hegemony across the valley as well as the entire state. Due
to Article 370, the sobering and secular influences of the rest of India
never permeated the state, while fundamentalist influences from across
the border built up ominously. By 1987-1989, the peaceful valley had
taken a Talibanic turn long before the term became notorious for the
extreme style of Islamic nation born in Afghanistan. It was no longer
safe for a kafir (non-believer).
As the Soviets started to exit Afghanistan during the same time period,
Pakistan rapidly switched its attention to Kashmir. Logistical know-how
acquired from the CIA in guerilla warfare was successfully transferred
against India, including the use of religious fundamentalism. The
Kashmir valley was ripe for upheaval, having already been allowed to
lose its diverse composition and character for four decades. The mix
exploded in 1989, with the ethnic cleansing by Pakistan-supported
Kashmiri Muslims of almost the entire remaining population of Pandits,
about 300,000. The Indian government has since severely compounded their
problems, and its own chances of bringing about normalcy, by ignoring
their voice in the future of the state.
Countering Jehad: The Challenges
The insurgency has been sustained since then by Pakistan, and its
brainchild the Taliban, with an increasing emphasis on fundamentalism
and jehad, and liberal use of dozens of well-funded international
terrorist bases in both countries. In 1991, India looked to repeat the
history of 1965, when it opened up a broad-based war to force an end to
a Pakistani invasion of the state. However, Pakistan had by then
acquired nuclear weapons, and effectively used the threat of nuclear
strikes to avert what would have been certain war to end the invasion.
Since then the Pakistani nuclear card has been a standard blackmail
tactic to keep its support for the largest international terrorist
operation alive.
The Indian government has tried different means to counter the
onslaught, hoping each time to capitalize on the local population's
fatigue with the endless violence. In 1996-1997, popular elections were
held at the state and central levels, and a trend towards normalcy
became evident, forcing Pakistan to rethink its strategies in sustaining
the insurgency. Predictably, Pakistan responded by turning up the heat,
handing over the reins of the insurgency to the most extreme of the
terrorist groups, Lashkar-e-Toiba, in collaboration with Osama Bin-Laden's
Al Qaida group. It also formed the United Jehad Council to ensure unity
and focus among the myriad terrorist groups operating from its
territory.
This refueling of the fires of Kashmir has proved to be self-sustaining
and reticent. Now tens of thousands of madrassas in Pakistan and
Afghanistan that train young impressionable minds combined with a
collapsed inward-looking economy that gives the impoverished population
few other choices for its children.
The second attempt began in 2000, after Hizbul Mujahideen's temporary
ceasefire. Hizbul, the only indigenous Kashmiri terrorist group, felt
the fatigue of the Kashmiri population and offered a unilateral
ceasefire. It did not last, however, as Pakistan set loose the Lashkar
in an orgy of killing. After the Hizbul, under intense pressure from its
Pakistani sponsors, withdrew its ceasefire, India followed up with its
own unilateral ceasefire in the last weeks of the year. The idea was to
tap into the palpable Kashmiri fatigue with violence. The Indian
military ended all offensive operations.
Peace Process: At What Cost?
The "peace process" has essentially consisted of avoidance of
offensive operations by Indian security forces, attempts to engage
Kashmiri separatist politicians, and official invitations to various
Kashmiri groups to start discussions on resolving the issues. The most
visible result has been the utter disregard for the ceasefire displayed
by Pakistan's terrorist groups, which have increased killings of
civilians including pro-India politicians and minority Hindu and Sikhs,
as well as security personnel deployed to protect them. Deaths among
terrorists have decreased, easily attributable to lack of new Indian
offensives. Thus the short-term cost of the ceasefire has been borne out
by civilians and hapless security personnel who have their hands tied
behind their back against the deadliest terrorist forces of the world.
Behind-the-scenes efforts were carried out to send feelers to the
leaders of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC), a conglomerate of
pro-separatist parties. After a charade of discussions among its
executive committee, the Hurriyat summarily rejected the talks offer of
the central government. What was their excuse to shut their eyes to the
glimmer of hope? That the central government had invited too many groups
from across the state. Abdul Ghani Bhat, leader of the Hurriyat used the
word "fish-market" to describe the government's approach. Thus
effectively all separatist organizations, militant and most of the
political ones, have rejected the ceasefire.
Getting to the Heart of the Kashmir Dispute
This last episode serves as a window into the reasons for the
intractability and the violence that the state has suffered for decades.
When Bhat used the term "fish-market", minorities in the state
knew all too well what he was talking about. For five decades, valley
Muslims have enjoyed total hegemony over the entire state, squeezing out
minorities whether religious, ethnic or regional. When the Indian
government invited a cross-section of groups of the state for
negotiations, it signalled a break from the Indian policy followed the
past half century – valley Muslims were not accorded recognition as
the sole representatives of the state. With the Indian government
looking the other way, all minorities had been sidelined before and
during the insurgency.
Clearly, what rankled both Hurriyat and the voice it really represents
– that of Pakistan, were unhappy that India wanted to deal with other
groups in the state. This was a blow to their long-established strategy
- establish total hegemony over most of the state to the point where it
looks, talks, and acts more like Pakistan and hence the solution will
become evident. While the "peace process" appears indeed
headed on a "train to nowhere", the crux of the Kashmir
dispute stands thoroughly exposed.
Is There Hope?
The question now is whether a significant section of Kashmir valley's
population will break free of the shackles of fundamentalism, jehad and
violence that it has locked itself in since 1989. The prospects are grim
and the reasons are to be found in two places – Pakistan and India.
Pakistan's entire identity now depends on its fight to grab Kashmir. It
has created a self-sustaining jehad industry that keeps large sections
of its military, religious and political bodies gainfully occupied. The
grooming of children in madrassas from a very young age will keep the
flames burning for generations. Collaboration with Bin Laden's network,
recruitment of Muslims from around the world, and promises to create
"more Pakistans" in India are ominous signs.
The other side of course is India itself, which has soft-pedaled valley
Muslims since Sheikh Abdullah bullied through a special status for the
state soon after its accession to India. India has allowed valley
Muslims to attain a highly exalted view of themselves, as a result of
Article 370 and regular coddling. In 1965 and 1971, India frittered away
hard-fought gains back to Pakistan. In 1999, the Kargil invasion was met
by a self-imposed ban on crossing the LOC. In December of the same year,
India caved in to Indian Airlines hijackers and released top Pakistani
terrorist leaders. A hundred odd lives were saved momentarily, at the
cost of thousands of civilians and security personnel who have since
been butchered by the rabidly extremist Jaish group formed by released
terrorist inspiration Masood Azhar. Even tiny Bangladesh has taken
advantage of the soft Indian state, recently capturing and then
torturing to death more than a dozen Indian border guards.
The ceasefire is ill-timed and reveals the bankruptcy of Indian
strategic thinking. Such a step would have been on the dot if it had
been taken after a prolonged offensive that decimated Pakistani
terrorist ranks and had them on the run. However, the many terrorist
groups have simply recognized the current ceasefire as weakness on
India's part, and are now preparing to enlarge their operations in the
coming warmer season. This explains the reflexive rejection of the
ceasefire and negotiation offers by these groups as well as by Hurriyat,
which simply follows their diktat.
Conclusion
Jammu and Kashmir, and in fact the entire Indian nation, is at a
crossroads today both due to Pakistan's ability to create a massive,
self-sustained terrorist enterprise, as well as the soft nation
characteristics of India. Caught in between are many sections of the
state's population, such as the Hindus who are in exile, and others who
live as virtual hostages of terrorists and their supporters in the
state. At this juncture, India can cave in further and agree to handing
over some or all of the state to fundamentalist elements controlled by
Pakistan, or it can dig in its heels acknowledging Jammu and Kashmir as
the last frontier in the fight to prevent further Talibanization of the
subcontinent. The latter choice may seem to be more painful, and will
require long-term measures such as abrogation of Article 370 and
recognition of equal rights of Pandits, Sikhs, Gujjars, Bakerwals and
residents of Jammu and Ladakh. Reorganization of the state, and its full
socioeconomic integration with the rest of India will be requisite steps
in such a scenario. The former choice will undoubtedly result in a new
satellite state of Pakistan, and the establishment of secure bases to
export Talibanization and insurgency into the rest of India. Whether
India can reverse its well-deserved "soft-state" status and
take the tough steps needed is open to question. |
