Countering the Ghauris, Ghaznavis
and Abdalis: Where's the TMD Debate?
Subodh Atal,
Ph. D.
The "Kashmir Issue" has several
components. There is the local Kashmiri Muslim "disenchantment",
the regional issues of Kashmir vs. Jammu vs. Ladakh, and the
Hindu-Muslim incompatibility in the valley. Then there is the
Pakistan/jehad factor. Many of these components are interconnected
and overlapping, however for simplicity's sake we can consider
them separately. If we do, one can attempt to assign solutions to
each one of the issues (Fig. 1). For example, the
"disenchantment", the regional issues and the question of Hindu
rights in the valley could be tackled by some combination of
devolution of powers and trifurcation/quadrification. However, we
also then come upon the reality of the confounding of issues: the
Pakistan/jehad factor will not allow any of these solutions to
evolve. And it is now eminently clear that neither political nor
diplomatic efforts are likely to eliminate that reticent factor.
In the last few years, and
especially in the aftermath of the October 1 and December 13
attacks last year and the May 14th attack this year, the option of
tackling the Pakistani jehadi infrastructure through military
means has been seriously debated in India. These military options
range from punitive strikes on terrorist camps, incursions into
POK to capture strategic infiltration routes and terrorist staging
areas, and a major war with Pakistan resulting in significant
degradation of its military and intelligence bodies, which are the
fountainheads for jehadi operations. Even the first option, which
is least likely to significantly alter the Pakistan/jehad factor,
may escalate into a full-scale war. The second option may be the
best from a cost/benefit point of view. It may also be achievable
militarily and in a timely manner before the inevitable western
intervention. The third option is least feasible, given the
military strengths of the two nations.
Since it is clear that "free and
fair" elections as well as political/diplomatic efforts are not
going to budge the Kashmir mountain, why has the military option
not been exercised by India? The simple answer is Pakistani
missiles. Delivery of nuclear weapons by PAF planes is unlikely,
given the superiority of the Indian air force and its
comprehensive air defense systems. However, the missile arsenal of
Pakistan is another matter. Pakistani Ghauris, Ghaznavis and
Abdalis, aptly named for Islamic invader-marauders of India, are
not only a nuclear threat, but could potentially wipe out India's
air superiority in hours. A 1999 RAND study commissioned by the US
Air Force pointed out that a Chinese M-class missile hit could
destroy 100 fighter planes parked in a 900 X 900 feet area at a US
air base (Fig. 2). Pakistani missile design is partly based on
illegal imports of this missile type. Nuclear missile attacks on
Indian cities would extract unbearable human and economic costs,
and even conventional missile attacks on cities would create
immense psychological damage. There is also the possibility of a
pre-emptive strike by Pakistan within the next few years, if it
perceives J&K to be slipping out of its grasp.
Thus it becomes imperative that a
missile defense system be rapidly deployed by India. Russian
S-300/Antey 2500 anti-missile batteries are already in operation.
However, not enough of these batteries have been procured to
provide adequate protection to strategic, economic and population
assets. India has been quietly trying to buy the Israeli Arrow
theater missile defense (TMD) system. The hurdle is the US, which
has veto power over Israel since the system was developed with
heavy American financing. Colin Powell, who is headed to South
Asia, plans to press India to shelve its plans for TMD deployment.
US State Department objections to the Arrow deal conjure up
missile proliferation scenarios - the same kind of objections
raised by the anti-Star Wars crowd in the 80s and long since
discarded. The Pentagon has not taken such an extreme line, and
may favor India in this debate.
What is surprising is that there
is almost no debate within India on how to deal with the Pakistan
missile threat. When Scuds came crashing into Israeli cities in
the Gulf War, that nation took it upon itself (with US help) to
build the Arrow, one of the most advanced TMD systems in the world
today. In the US, the Soviet ICBM threat during the Cold War had
triggered the Star Wars debate, and the "rogue nation" fears of
the 90s convinced even the Democrats to favor missile defense.
Despite India's own rogue nation problem in its neighborhood,
there is little public awareness or talk in the national media
about how to counter the Pakistani missile threat.
India needs to convey to the US
State Department that protecting millions of Indian citizens
overrides any technical concerns about the Missile Technology
Control Regime, just as the ABM was summarily shelved by the US to
protect American lives. As the Israelis are saying, the Arrow deal
makes strategic and economic sense to the western world. India is
an important global player, and successful nuclear attacks on its
cities would not only create a humanitarian catastrophe, but would
reverberate economically and politically around the world. Can one
imagine what effect such a scenario would have on the already
shaky US economy?
If the Arrow procurement is
blocked, India needs to examine options for expeditiously buying
sufficient quantities of advanced versions of the Russian S-300
ABM system. While the S-300 is not as accurate as the Arrow,
missile defense theory dictates that use of a higher number of
interceptors can make up for inaccuracy. Population centers would
need to be covered by a missile defense architecture that provides
over 99% protection, while assets such as air bases could get by
with fewer interceptors and a somewhat lower protection level.
The costs of adequate quantities
of either the Arrow or the S-300 to provide a sufficient umbrella,
that deters Pakistan from wielding the nuclear threat, would be
high, running potentially in billions of dollars. However, one
needs to weigh this against the cost of the forward deployment by
India plus the continuing counter-insurgency operations in Jammu
and Kashmir. These costs run into millions of dollars per month.
As is becoming increasingly clear, these costs are likely to
continue unless India is able to exercise the military option to
capture infiltration routes and staging areas in POK, and this is
not possible without first deploying a TMD system that can
neutralize Pakistan's missile threat. Indian media needs to take
the lead in this debate, and force the government to let its
citizens know how it plans to protect them from missiles and bring
about a comprehensive resolution to the Kashmir issue. |