Another Swing of the Pendulum
Ajai Sahni
Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute for
Conflict Management
India's policy on Jammu
& Kashmir (J&K), on terrorism, and on the principal sponsor of terrorism
in South Asia - Pakistan - has often been criticized for its
inconsistencies. Over the past years, however, an increasing consistency
has been evident - though perhaps not in any particularly constructive
sense: the consistency of a pendulum, swinging with insistent regularity
from one extreme to the other.
This fruitless cycle has been repeated in an endless succession of
'peace initiatives' at the highest level - regularly interrupted by
escalating violence, military mobilization, coercive diplomacy and
belligerent political rhetoric - certainly since the Prime Minister's
'Ramadan Ceasefire' (cessation of offensive operations against
terrorists) in November 2000, and indeed, at different stages before.
The current set of initiatives is one more directionless link in a chain
that is steadily losing credibility, even among those who watch these
processes from a great distance. Thus, the US Congressional Research
Service has already dismissed the current process as 'moribund', though
a delusional Indian media and a gaggle of 'experts' committed to what
has been called, in another context, the 'political realism of
appeasement', continue to wax eloquent on the 'confidence
building measures'
announced.
The current 'peace process', like its predecessors, is doomed to
inevitable failure, in the first instance, because, it does not reflect
the realities of the ground, or any radical shift in the fundamental
positions, either of India or Pakistan. Thus, any negotiations, within
this context, would seek only to advance the tactical objectives of the
engaging parties. The possibilities of a fundamental and strategic shift
in the Pakistani perspective, and tactical agenda are remote. Pakistan -
and the elites that control power, not just the present regime, in that
country - remains entirely committed to its founding ideology of
Islamism and religious exclusion, and consequently, to undermining the
integrity of the secular, democratic Indian nation state
(characteristics that India would be entirely unwilling to compromise or
dilute). Evidence of Pakistan's unwavering strategic perspectives -
despite broad tactical variations - can be discovered in relation to
recent events and policies in another theatre: Afghanistan. In the wake
of the 9/11 incidents and US pressure on Pakistan to join the 'global
coalition against terror', Pakistan was widely seen to have performed a
u-turn on its Afghan policy, and to have 'abandoned' its long standing
quest for 'strategic depth' through interference in the internal affairs
of that country. Proof of the Pakistani 'u-turn' has been vociferously
asserted through a steady dribble of
Al Qaeda
cadres handed over to US Forces, though it is far from clear how much of
this trickle is voluntary or coerced. Nevertheless, as the American
attention wavers, there is mounting evidence that Pakistan is reviving
its earlier policies on Afghanistan, using various proxies to put the
Hamid Karzai regime under pressure, and offering its 'services' to
America to help mobilize forces - including the remnants of its
surrogate, the Taliban, incredibly being repackaged as a 'moderate
Taliban' - that could 'help fill' the existing power vacuum in the
uncontrolled areas beyond Kabul's sway. Clearly, while Pakistan has
executed dramatic policy shifts to cope with the exigencies and
imperatives arising out of the post-9/11 scenario, its fundamental
strategic perspectives remain tied to the pre-9/11 world, and to the
original ideological impulses of its creation. This fact underpins its
responses in J&K, and with regard to its wider support to terrorism in
various theatres in India as well.
The most probable assumption, consequently, is that the current 'peace
process' will simply be used by Pakistan as an instrumentality to focus
attention on what it calls the 'core issue' of Kashmir. As a result, an
extended process of 'negotiations' may be entered into, but would remain
no more than a charade (the obvious mischievousness of some of
Pakistan's 'counter-proposals', indeed, the rather shrill rhetoric on
both sides, seems to suggest that the shared intent is more theatrical
than substantive). Terrorist activities on Indian soil would,
consequently, be sustained; would be calibrated to the exigencies of
both bilateral and international developments; and would tend to be held
at maximal levels at which 'credible minimal deniability' can be
maintained. Over the coming weeks, state support by Pakistan to
terrorist organizations, and their visible presence and activities on
Pakistani soil, may temporarily be driven deeper underground; as the
'peace initiative' is seen to progress, some symbolic - but necessarily
ineffectual - action may again be taken against some of the groups to
demonstrate Pakistan's 'seriousness' in 'tackling terrorism'; but
terrorist activities in J&K and other parts of India would be retained
at the maximum possible within the limits of international tolerance.
Increasingly, moreover, assertive elements in the Army and the Inter
Services Intelligence, as well as fundamentalist political and extremist
groupings in Pakistan, would tend to promote and consolidate independent
capacities to promote the jehadi agenda; past experience, however, has
demonstrated that Musharraf would, nevertheless, retain control, since
most of the jehadi groups are, in fact, held firmly 'by the scruff of
their necks' by the Army. Such groups will also continue to cement
alliances with various other Islamist extremist entities, such as the al
Qaeda and the Taliban, active or present in Pakistan, as well as with
the organized criminal underground. At the stage where Pakistan finds
itself losing out in the propaganda war over the 'peace process', these
entities can be expected to immediately escalate violence to engineer
major terrorist strikes in India at a stage where the blame for a
'breakdown' can passed on to alleged Indian intransigence.
The space for covert sponsorship of terrorism in South Asia - by both
state and non-state entities - is seen to have substantially expanded
after a temporary post-9/11 contraction, particularly since the
beginning of the US campaign in Iraq, and increasingly since the
apparently mismanaged 'peace' there. The future of terrorism in South
Asia is integrally linked to the stabilization of both Afghanistan and
Iraq, and perceptions of US vulnerabilities in these theatres will
encourage traditional sponsors of terrorism in South Asia to escalate
terrorist campaigns, not only against rivals within the region, but
increasingly against US and Western interests as well. The continuous
succession of strikes against US Forces in Iraq; the growing disorders
in Afghanistan; the rising and manifest consternation in the US
regarding the increasing toll in American lives; and the growing
significance of events in Iraq in US domestic politics and President
Bush's re-election prospects next year, are all creating complex
incentives for an escalation in terror across the world. The ideologues
and campaign managers of Islamist extremism are becoming convinced that
the world's sole superpower - though it cannot be confronted directly in
conventional conflict - is nevertheless vulnerable to the 'war of the
flea'. The destruction of the capacities and infrastructure of
terrorism, consequently, now becomes the most urgent imperative of the
global war against terrorism. Unfortunately, there is little evidence of
significant diminution in these, despite the steady stream of
'victories' chalked up through the arrest or neutralization of
individual terrorists.
Courtesy:
South Asia Terrorism Portal |
