J&K: Fidayeen Strike at Sunjwan

J&K: Fidayeen Strike at Sunjwan
Praveen Swami

General Pervez Musharraf watched stone-faced as United States President George Bush announced a meagre US$ 3 billion aid package for Pakistan, and shot down that country's demands for new F-16 combat jets. It opened him up to a barrage of criticism from his domestic critics, Islamist and democratic, who charged that he had given away too much to the United States and received little or nothing in return. Four days after the Bush-Musharraf press conference at Camp David, two fidayeen terrorists cut the fence protecting the perimeter of the 36 Infantry Brigade's camp in Sunjwan, on the outskirts of Jammu. The terrorists made their way to a barracks, and shot dead a dozen soldiers, most in their sleep.

Clear cut? Not quite.

Two major explanations have been put out for the timing of the Sunjwan suicide attack. First, it took place on a day President Abdul Kalam was due to visit the Hazratbal shrine in Srinagar, a political and religious signifier of unequalled import in the Kashmir valley. Second, commentators speculated, the attack could have been intended to signal that Musharraf simply 'could not contain' jihadi groups until India and the United States gave larger concessions to Pakistan. Commentators in Pakistan pointed out that even the US Central Command had conceded that Pakistan had lost US $10 billion by allowing the use of its air and land to US Forces. Zia-ul-Haq, it was pointed out, had secured aid worth US$ 4.2 billion and 40 F-16s for his acquiescence to the United States' war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, while Benazir Bhutto secured US$ 4.6 billion and 60 F-16s.

Both explanations are plausible, but not wholly satisfying. For one, the thesis that the Sunjwan attack was intended to send a signal to India rests on the assumption that Jihadi groups can strike at will, and at intensity levels of their choosing. That simply isn't the case. Since January 2003, seven attempted fidayeen attacks have been reported in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), six of them on security force installations. In only one incident was the number of security personnel killed greater than the number of terrorists eliminated during the response to the attack. This was on April 25, when a Border Security Force (BSF) camp near Bandipora was attacked, leading to the loss of three soldiers and the elimination of two terrorists. In several instances - an assault on the 24 Rashtriya Rifles camp at Dragmulla, Kupwara, on April 29, or a May 1 attack on the BSF near Tral - the attackers were shot with no security force losses at all. In one instance in February, the Army intercepted and killed Peshawar resident Rizwan Khan even before he could commence his planned suicide strike near Jammu.

Put crudely, setting off bombs on buses or massacring villagers are time tested and relatively more reliable means of 'sending signals': fidayeen attacks, for all their drama, just aren't as sure or effective. Over the years, Indian security forces have developed fairly well drilled systems for dealing with suicide attacks and the figures show that these have generally operated with success. An April 26, 2003, attempt on the Radio Kashmir building in Srinagar attempted to mimic the tactics adopted in the attack on India's Parliament by using an explosives-laden car with an official beacon. Central Reserve Police Force guards, however, refused to allow the car into the complex, compelling the terrorists to detonate outside the building. Three terrorists were killed, with none of their objectives achieved. That fidayeen tactics are loosing their shock value is also evident from the fact that, while 2001 registered 28 fidayeen attacks, the number fell to just 10 in 2002.

An internal investigation has been ordered to find out just why the perimeter guards in Sunjwan were unable to detect the terrorists who cut their fence, but it is clear the lapse is not part of a general pattern. What does seem probable is that the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), which is believed by intelligence officials to have carried out the attack, used its not-inconsiderable assets in Jammu to plan the attack and provide shelter to the fidayeen for some time in the vicinity of the Sunjwan army camp. Just last June, the Jammu and Kashmir Police had arrested Pakistani national Zulfikar Rana, who also used the name Mir Husain. A top Lashkar operative, Rana had purchased a large home in Jammu's Ustad Mohalla area, a short walk from the Sunjwan camp. He spent over Rs. 2 million on the home, and acquiring fake identification and 'state subject' papers. Posing as an inconspicuous businessman, Rana ran a broad Lashkar network operating in the Rajouri, Poonch and Doda districts.

But the fact remains that the Sunjwan attack has shattered a brief lull that set in after the end of April, when the India-Pakistan peace process seemed briefly to be gathering momentum. Now, Musharraf may well acquiesce in a sharp escalation in hostilities, hoping to convince the United States that he can only rein in Islamist groups if India makes significant progress towards concessions on Jammu and Kashmir. Musharraf's persistent tactic has been to make covert alliances with the jihadis, and use the threat they present to seek concessions from the United States. Now, however, there is some evidence that the jihadis are starting to resent being used, and asking for payback. In a June 29 television interview, top Islamist leader Fazl-ul-Rahman described the General as "the American ambassador."

There are also signs of dissent in the Pakistan Army. Some reports suggest that Lieutenant General Mohammad Aziz, a senior military figure known for his Islamist leanings, who was 'kicked upstairs' under US pressure in 2001, has now begun to campaign against Musharraf. Accompanied by retired Major General Mohammad Anwar Khan, the President of the 'Azad Kashmir' region of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (which excludes the 'Northern Areas'), Aziz has been holding meetings in the remote tribal regions of northern Pakistan, delivering speeches that are 'virulently critical of India and Hinduism' and that 'also give hints of his disapproval of Musharraf's refusal to shed the post of COAS.' The Islamist Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), which Musharraf helped bring to power, is now starting to growl at its creator, and is demanding that the General demit either his role as Pakistan's President, or its Chief of Army Staff.

It is much too early to say, of course, whether the Musharraf-Mullah honeymoon is truly approaching an end. What is clear, however, is that Pakistan is once again in flux - and, as a consequence, Jammu and Kashmir is more than likely soon to be subjected to uncomfortably 'interesting times'.

Courtesy: South Asia Terrorism Portal