The State as Suicide Bomber
Ajai Sahni
General Pervez
Musharraf's visit to the US is a crucial moment in the history of South
Asia, and what transpires between him and President George W. Bush at
the scheduled conclave at Camp David will substantially determine not
only the direction of future events and equations in this region, but
also the future of international Islamist terrorism. For it is in
America's handling of what Bernard Henri Levi has described as "the most
delinquent of nations" that the proximate future of Islamist terrorism
will be defined. Pakistan remains, today, the primary "platform for
terror", in Ambassador Nancy Powell's words, and neutralizing this
platform is among the primary challenges of the global war against
terrorism. In dealing with General Musharraf, it will be useful for his
interlocutors to keep in mind - no doubt among other and more expedient
matters - that they are dealing with the man who currently presides over
the world's largest network of terrorists, and over a state that has,
for over two decades, used terrorism as an integral instrument of state
policy - and still continues to do so from day to day.
This terrorism is widely nuanced and exploits every possible weakness in
both adversary and ally. This is why America's policies since 9/11, with
their overwhelming reliance on financial sops, have failed to
significantly alter the character of the Pakistani state, or to
dismantle the infrastructure of terrorism on its soil. Nor will
provision of further financial relief change anything, beyond giving
Pakistan's ruling elite another billion or two to fritter away on
military adventures and their quest for strategic extension through
Islamist extremism. Pakistan has been surviving on international charity
for much of its existence, and this has not strengthened the country, or
created a sound domestic production base and economy. Pakistan is, at
best, and temporarily, a 'rich beggar', and cannot be expected to retain
this status unless it radically restructures both its politics and its
economy. There is little evidence, yet, of such restructuring, and any
transformations that may have occurred have only tended to entrench the
Islamist extremist elements even deeper in the nation's politics.
And yet, despite the growing international recognition of Pakistan's
continued role in supporting and sustaining international terrorism,
there is virtual acceptance of the fact that Musharraf will come away
from Camp David with significant 'rewards' for 'helping America' in its
war against terrorism. It is useful, within this context, to assess what
it is the General will seek at Camp David, and the strategy he would
employ to secure what he wants.
The first component of the General's quest is 'more of the same' -
further financial aid in the form of a waiver of bilateral debt to the
tune of US $ 1.8 billion. America had already written off $ 1 billion as
a reward for Pakistan's 'support' in Afghanistan against the
Taliban
and
Al Qaeda,
and had also helped secure large external inflows, concessional
multilateral loans and grants that have helped Pakistan build up foreign
exchange reserves of US $10.5 billion form a position of near
bankruptcy.
The second crucial component is to force the acceptance of a 'clear road
map for resolution of the Kashmir conflict' on what is being propounded
as the 'Chenab' formula, which envisages the division of Kashmir along
religious lines, with Muslim-majority areas going to Pakistan. This
formula would reconfirm Pakistan's underlying ideology of religious
exclusion - the two nation theory -, would confer a quantifiable
'victory' on its strategy of cross border terrorism, and would further
the Islamist fundamentalist enterprise within the region.
The third component - currently being actively pursued - is a renewed
role in Afghanistan, as America struggles to contain the revival of the
Taliban movement. Pakistan is, once again, offering to 'step in' to fill
the power vacuum by 'mediating' with Taliban survivors, as well as other
radical Islamist groupings such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hizb-I-Islami.
With American frustrations in Afghanistan mounting, the possibility of a
revival of a surrogate Pakistani influence in that country is being
actively sought, and threatens to give rise to another political
travesty, if the US succumbs to the imperatives of expediency.
Musharraf will also seek to negotiate a 'free hand' for himself and his
military regime in Pakistan. The rigged elections of October 2002 have
not produced the compliant Parliament and State Assemblies that
Musharraf had hoped for, and these bodies are now creating problems on
the General's continuance as both President and Chief of Army Staff. In
addition, the Talibanised Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) administration
in the North West Frontier Province is proving to be a source of both
domestic and international embarrassment, and there is significant
speculation in Pakistan that Musharraf would seek carte blanche for the
suspension or dismissal of these 'elected' bodies in case present
political maneuvers fail to secure his continuance with full powers, or
if the Parliament or Assemblies present him with unacceptable
difficulties.
Finally, Musharraf would like to come away with a lifting of the present
embargo on military supplies to Pakistan, and a substantial package of
Arms, including the delivery of a batch of 40 F-16s that have been
sought by Pakistan since the early 1980s.
It is in the last of these that Pakistan's strategy of negotiation is
most clearly demonstrated. During his present international tour, in an
interview to The Times in London, Musharraf argued that, with a
rise in India's defence spending, coupled with restrictions on
Pakistan's acquisition of military equipment, a 'dangerous imbalance'
was emerging in the force levels between the two countries. In such
circumstances, he declared, "Pakistan would have no choice but to rely
on its nuclear weapons."
This pattern of continued nuclear blackmail has consistently been at the
heart of Pakistan's case for concessions, aid and a heightened threshold
of international tolerance for its sponsorship and support to Islamist
terrorism. To understand how this works, it is useful to conceive of
Pakistan as a state acting as a suicide bomber, arguing that, if it does
not receive the extraordinary dispensations and indulgences that it
seeks, it will, in effect 'implode', and in the process do extraordinary
harm to others. Part of the threat of this 'implosion' is also the
specter of the transfer of its nuclear arsenal and capabilities to more
intransigent and irrational elements of the Islamist far right in
Pakistan, who would not be amenable to the logic that its present rulers
- whose interests in terrorism are strategic, and consequently, subject
to considerations of strategic advantage - are willing to heed.
This is the bluff that the Musharraf dictatorship has confronted the
Western world with, at least for the past twenty months, and it is a
bluff that the world has failed to call. It has allowed the General to
dismiss an elected government; to rig elections; to continue supporting
the operation of terrorist groups from, and the existence of their
infrastructure on, Pakistani soil; and despite all this, to secure
massive financial and political rewards, instead of the natural
penalties that should have attached to such criminality of conduct.
It is improbable that this bluff will finally be called at Camp David,
but it would be worse than myopic if President Bush fails to heed the
warning that came from Mike Evanoff, the chief of diplomatic security at
the US Embassy in Islamabad: "This is the epicenter for terrorism. It
really is. This is the only country I know in the world that has so many
groups that are against the US or Western ideals."
Courtesy:
South Asia Terrorism Portal |
