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Volume 3, No. 1 - June 2003 |
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PAKISTAN: A Political
Deadlock B. Raman A little more than two weeks before his scheduled departure for the USA for high-profile talks with President Bush at Camp David, Pakistan's President Gen. Pervez Musharraf finds himself confronted with an embarrassing political deadlock, which does not bode well for his self-projected image as the designer of democracy in Pakistani colours. 2. The coalition of six religious fundamentalist parties called the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), with the support of the Pakistan Muslim League (N) of Nawaz Sharif,the Pakistan People's Party Parliamentarians (PPPP) of Mrs. Benazir Bhutto and other smaller anti-military political parties, has been waging a relentless battle against Musharraf's continuing to function as "the olive green President", wearing the two hats of the President of the Republic and the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS). Another objective of its battle is to force Musharraf seek re-election as the President under the provisions laid down in the Constitution, according to which the President is to be elected by a joint electoral college consisting of the elected members of the federal Parliament and the provincial Legislative Assemblies. Musharraf got himself elected last year through a referendum, which was alleged to have been blatantly rigged with the complicity of the Election Commission, which has already ordered the destruction of all the records pertaining to it. 3. The opposition led by the MMA has also been challenging the various constitutional amendments grouped together under a Legal Framework Order (LFO), which Musharraf had got promulgated before the elections of October 10 last. The LFO restores or vastly increases the powers of the President in matters such as appointments of the chiefs of the armed forces, judges of the federal and provincial high courts, the head and members of the Election Commission, governors of the provinces etc, dismissal of an elected government and the elected Assemblies and the constitution of a National Security Council chaired by the President and not the Prime Minister. Through the LFO, Musharraf has sough to give Pakistan a revised Constitution more akin to that of France than those of other parliamentary democracies, which follow the British model. 4. The Government headed by Prime Minister Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali, which is a coalition dominated by the Musharraf-engineered PML (Qaide Azam), finds itself legislatively paralysed due to the battle waged by the MMA and its supporters in the Federal Parliament. Even though it is more than six months since the elections to the National Assembly were held, no formal legislative business could be transacted so far due to the deadlock. The two Houses of Parliament have been functioning without even the formal inauguration of the session by a presidential address outlining the policy goals of the Government. This is attributed to the fears of Musharraf that he might be heckled if he appeared before a joint session for this purpose. 5. While the federal Government thus finds itself stymied in its efforts to project a democratic image of Pakistan, the deadlock has not come in the way of the administration of the country. The economy continues to show sustained improvement under the stewardship of Shaukat Aziz, the Finance Minister, who enjoys the confidence of Musharraf and the international financial institutions. The Government's response---positive, but not totally-- to India's overtures for re-opening the bilateral dialogue process has not been inhibited by the murky political situation. 6.Till now, Musharraf has had the Army, the judiciary and the general public behind him in his confrontation with the opposition parties led by the MMA. Despite his vastly enhanced powers, his positive international image and good vibrations with the US administration, Musharraf has resisted any tendency to ride roughshod over any dissenting views in the Army. His authoritarianism is tempered by his habit of seeking consensus in the army and the civilian bureaucracy in favour of his views. His views ultimately prevail, but are not seen as imposed on the military-civilian bureaucracy from above. 7. Even before he assumed power in October 1999, he was known as an officer, who was responsive to the views of his colleagues and subordinates in the military and sought their prior approval for his decisions. He has maintained this practice. Moreover, all the present Corps Commanders got their promotion as Lt.Generals under his stewardship and hence are assumed to owe a personal loyalty to him. For these reasons, he should normally have no reasons to fear dissent in the armed forces over the way he has been handling the political crisis. 8. The present judiciary was largely picked and chosen by him after he assumed office and has been systematically softened by him through various lollipops such as extended tenure through increase in their retirement age etc. Many of them thus owe their career and comforts to him and have found ways of standing by him whenever his decisions have been challenged before the courts. 9. While some sections of the elite (it is difficult to quantify them) have backed the opposition's political struggle against him, the general public of the country has by and large remained indifferent till now to the campaign against him. The bitter memories of the past style of governance of Sharif and Benazir remain strong. The fact that both these leaders have chosen for themselves the safety and comforts of political exile instead of facing the wrath of the regime by returning to the country has not done any good to their image. The visible signs of improvement in the economy marked by an increase in tax collection and foreign exchange reserves, rise in exports, a remarkably buoyant stock market, flood of external cash flow etc and the improved international image of Pakistan under Musharraf have had their impact on the attitude of the general public towards him. 10. The MMA is still able to draw large crowds into the streets to demonstrate against his co-operation with the USA against the Taliban and Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda and International Islamic Front (IIF), the US invasion of Iraq etc, but its ability to draw similar crowds to protest against his arbitrary political style and against his continuing as the COAS is still to be proved though the MMA has been threatening to take recourse to public agitation if its efforts to reach a compromise through talks with the Government fail. 11. The MMA owed its remarkable success in the October elections to Musharraf's munificence. He ordered the withdrawal of the cases against many of their candidates from the anti-terrorism courts so that they were not disqualified by the Election Commission. He made the Election Commission pass an order giving the certificates in Islamic studies issued by the madrasas the equivalence of an university degree so that the newly-introduced electoral provision that only graduates can contest elections did not come in the way of the mullas and their proteges contesting the polls. He broke the PML (N) and the PPPP, thereby weakening their ability to counter the religious fundamentalist parties. 12.One would have, therefore, expected that the mullas would have been grateful to him and refrained from raising issues inconvenient to him. Instead, they have been relentlessly challenging his self-assumed political supremacy and seeking to reduce his powers. Before October last, all religious fundamentalist parties---and particularly the Jamaat-e-Islami (JEI) of Qazi Hussain Ahmed--- were viewed as the stooges of the army, amenable to its pressure. The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the COAS never had difficulty in the past in calling the mullas to order, except on rare occasions. When Qazi Hussain Ahmed strongly opposed Musharraf's visit to India for the Agra summit in 2001, one courtesy call on him by Lt. Gen.Ehsanul Haq, the present Director-General of the ISI who was then the Corps Commander at Peshawar, was sufficient to make the Qazi relent in his opposition. 13. Ehsanul Haq, who is an old personal and family friend of the Qazi, and his senior officers in the ISI have repeatedly failed since October last in their efforts to make the Qazi and other leaders of the MMA see reason. The ISI and the Intelligence Bureau (IB) have not so far been able to engineer a split in the opposition ranks. The MMA gives the impression of being prepared to face the risk of a dissolution of the National Assembly and the provincial Assemblies of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Balochistan and fresh elections in which, without the bounties of Musharraf, it may not do as well as it did in October. 14.The questions which inevitably arise in one's mind are: What explains the unity and seeming confidence of the religious opposition? Are there elements not only in the military-intelligence establishment, but also in the scientific circles associated with Pakistan's nuclear and missile capability, which, while openly supporting Musharraf, have been covertly instigating the MMA not to relent? If so, who are these elements? Is it possible to quantify their strength? Data presently available do not permit convincing answers to these questions. 15. However, one has to note reports of Musharraf's pro-US policies causing unhappiness not only in the general public, but also in some sections of the armed forces and the scientific community. There are reportedly elements, which are yet to reconcile themselves to some of his actions such as assisting the US in its efforts to destroy the Taliban, giving the US intelligence agencies a free run of the country, subjecting renowned scientists, doctors and other professionals to the humiliation of detention and interrogation just because of the suspicion of the US intelligence of their having possible links with Al Qaeda, rendering Dr.A.Q.Khan, the so-called father of Pakistan's atomic bomb, a virtual non-person by removing him, reportedly under US pressure, from all positions of executive power in the scientific field and starting a campaign to play down his role in the development of Pakistan's military nuclear capability etc. There are continuing reports of unease in the army and the Foreign Office over his covert intelligence co-operation with the US against Iran. However, there are at present no indicators to suggest that such pockets of unhappiness of undetermined strength could create serious dissensions in the establishment against him. 16. The NWFP, which is now ruled by the MMA, and Balochistan, which is ruled by the MMA and PML(QA) in coalition, have been adding to the headaches and embarrassment of Musharraf. The MMA Government in the NWFP has not only brazenly given sanctuary and protection to the survivors of Al Qaeda and Taliban, but has also been trying to talibanise the province by setting up a department of virtue and vice and by having a law enacted for the enforcement of the Islamic shariat laws in the province. 17. In Balochistan, there has been a deterioration in the law and order situation since October, with at least three reported explosions disrupting oil and gas supplies through pipelines to the industries and other consumers of Punjab and Sindh. A public agitation against the Chinese-assisted Gwadar port development project has been gathering momentum. The Balochi nationalists have been critical of the induction of a large number of Punjabis and Pashtuns into the province to work in this project. 18. Musharraf's personal and political gains hitherto by positioning himself as the frontline ally of the US in the war against terrorism would stand in danger of being reduced, if not wiped out, if he is not able to bring the MMA and the administration controlled by it in the NWFP to order. The spectre of the resurgence of the Taliban and Al Qaeda from the fertile soil of the NWFP and Balochistan would increasingly haunt the US and the rest of the international community if the alarming developments in the NWFP are not arrested and reversed. 19. There are some indications that Musharraf might already be contemplating some action. He has reportedly initiated some action against terrorist organisations, which are close to the constituents of the MMA. Examples are the reported action against the Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) of Kashmir, which is an appendage of the JEI, and the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM) and the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM), which are close to the Jamiat-ul-Ulema Islam (JUI) of Maulana Fazlur Rahman. At the same time, he has avoided action against the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), which has no association with any of the constituents of the MMA, so that he does not lose the services of this organisation, the largest of the Pakistani terrorist organisations, in his proxy war against India. 20. The heads of the local administrative councils of the NWFP called Nazims have collectively resigned reportedly at his instigation on the ground that the provincial government has been interfering in their functioning, which could be projected by him as a legitimate ground for proclaiming the break-down of the constitution in the province. It has been reported that the Federal Government has unilaterally, without the concurrence of the provincial government, ordered the transfer of the Chief Secretary and the Inspector-General of Police of the province. 21. The matters seem to be moving towards an intensification of the confrontation and the ultimate denouement may come before his visit to the US. He would like to go there with his seeming strength and following in the eyes of the US unimpaired and as a leader totally in command of the military and of the situation in the country whose value as a stalwart ally remains undiminished. 22. Will he wield the big stick against the religious fundamentalist parties and, if he did, what will be the impact in the country? The indications till now are that if he did so, he might be able to get away with it just as he got away with his volte face in Afghanistan in October, 2001, when warnings of a public upsurge against him proved to be wrong. (The writer is Additional Secretary (Retired), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Convenor, Advisory Committee, Observer Research Foundation (ORF), Chennai Chapter. E-Mail: corde@vsnl.com ) |
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