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| Volume 3, No. 7 - December 2003 | << Back to formatted version |
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INDO-PAK CEASEFIRE: Before & After B. Raman It would be premature and unwise to treat the so-called cease-fire to which India and Pakistan have agreed and which went into effect on the midnight of November 25, 2003, as the proverbial light at the end of the tunnel. One wished it were, but one should not have any illusions that it is. For the present, unless future developments warrant a more optimistic assessment, one has to treat it as one more tactical phase in Pakistan's proxy war against India through the use of terrorism and Pakistani and other jihadi mercenaries to annex Jammu & Kashmir. It is not a cease-fire in a hot war. There was no hot war between the two. Nor is it a cease-fire in Pakistan's proxy war against India. It has not given any assurance of winding up the jihadi terrorist infrastructure in Pakistani territory. Nor has it renounced its use of jihadi terrorism as a strategic weapon against India. The cease-fire essentially suspends the use of trans-border and trans-Line of control (LOC) exchanges of artillery and other fire by the security forces of the two countries. Such exchanges were initiated by Pakistan for two tactical reasons. First, to facilitate the infiltration of trained and armed jihadi terrorists under the protective cover of the fire. Second, to frustrate the efforts of the Indian security agencies to erect a border fencing in the Jammu area to prevent infiltrations. The Indian firing used to be in retaliation for the Pakistani barrages. The idea of a trans-LOC cease-fire has from time to time been floated by Pakistan, the last occasion when it was mooted being during President Pervez Musharraf's visit to New York in September to attend the UN General Assembly session. Indian security agencies have always been suspect of Pakistani motives in proposing a trans-border/trans-LOC ceasefire. They had two genuine misgivings. First, they viewed it as a Pakistani propaganda ploy to claim that continued acts of terrorism in J&K even after the cease-fire, proved wrong Indian allegations that violence in J&K was due to the cross-border infiltration of Pakistani jihadi terrorists. Second, to force the Indian security forces to refrain from firing on infiltrators who manage to cross the border/LOC without the need for a covering fire from the Pakistani army. There are only
certain sectors where the infiltrators need protective covering fire
from the It is not clear whether the Pakistani announcement of an unilateral observance of a cease-fire, despite India's openly-expressed skepticism of past Pakistani proposals in this regard which were not followed up, was the outcome of any scenario carefully worked out between the two countries in secret back-channel talks. Though there is so far no definitive indication of any such secret talks, the rapidity with which the modalities for the cease-fire have been agreed to within 48 hours does give rise to a feeling that the developments were probably the culmination of some secret probings, directly or indirectly through intermediaries. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Pakistani announcement has, therefore, to be viewed as meant to force India to reciprocate lest New Delhi be viewed negatively by the international community if it rejected it. India has reciprocated, but has at the same time made it clear that such a cease-fire would be durable only if it is accompanied by Pakistan giving up its use of cross-border terrorism. The Indian Army has also made it clear that its acceptance of the cease-fire "is without any prejudice to counter-infiltration measures and anti-terrorist operations in J&K." The cease-fire has come at a time when Pakistan's strategic interest in keeping alive its jihadi terrorism against India would not be affected by such a move for the following reasons: - Pakistan
already has a sufficient number of trained and armed infiltrators inside
J & K. to keep the proxy war going for at least 12 to 18 months
despite the cease-fire and without the need for large-scale fresh
infiltrations. There were 2284 infiltrations in the year
2000; 2417 in 2001; 1400 in 2002 and 1410 up to September 30, 2003, as
against 1028 during the - The Pakistani move has come on the eve of the onset of the winter when infiltration even with protective fire becomes difficult and hence instances of such firing tend to come down. By observing a cease-fire during the winter months, Pakistan would not be creating any operational disadvantages for itself. The need for continued circumspection by India is also warranted by the following indicators that wile and insincerity continue to be important components of Pakistan's strategy relating to not only India, but also Afghanistan: - Under US pressure, Musharraf re-issued his ban orders on some of the Pakistani jihadi organisations last week, but the orders were more reflective of his strategem to ensure the continued availability of jihadi terrorists as Pakistan's strategic weapons than of his desire for a break with his past policy. He banned the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) under its new name and ordered the sealing of its offices all over Pakistan except in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK) and the Northern Areas (Gilgit and Baltistan), but spared its leaders and trained jihadis from arrest. He banned the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM) under its new name too, but did not seal its offices or arrest its leaders and jihadis. He merely placed the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), which contributes the largest number of Pakistani infiltrators into India, in a so-called meaningless watch-list. He did not even ban the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI) or place it even in the watch list. - Despite growing American concern over the come-back of the Taliban, he has not acted against the terrorist infrastructure of the Taliban and Gulbuddin Heckmatyar's Hizb-e-Islami in Pakistani territory. - He has given no indication of any willingness to hand over to India 20 terrorists wanted for various offences in Indian courts, who have been given shelter in Pakistan. Only one of them is from J&K. While announcing
on November 23, 2003, an unilateral observance of a cease-fire, Prime
Minister Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali of Pakistan has reacted a little
more positively than Pakistan did initially to the set of
confidence-building measures (CBMs) proposed by Prime Minister Atal
Bihari Vajpayee last month for improving people-people contacts and
communications by road, rail and sea between the two countries,
including the inauguration of a bus service between Srinagar, the
capital of J&K, and Muzzafarabad, the capital of POK. The Government of India has described the Pakistani reactions as a whole as encouraging. Whether it leads to a real thaw would depend on the following factors: - Its agreeing to remove the ban on the overflights of Indian civilian aircraft over its territory. Till now, it has not been agreeing to it in order to create difficulties in the Indian supply of assistance to the Government of Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan and in the trade relations between India and Afghanistan. - Its handing over the 20 terrorists wanted by India for trial. - Its allowing the Indian Consulate in Karachi, which was ordered to be closed down in December,1994, to be re-opened. - Its banning the LET and enforcing effectively the various ban orders on jihadi terrorist organisations. - Its non-interference in the erection of the border fencing in the Jammu sector. - Its winding up the anti-India jihadi terrorist infrastructure in its territory. Interestingly, Pakistan's unilateral declaration of a cease-fire and its more positive response to the CBMs proposed by the Indian Prime Minster last month have come in the wake of the recent indications of the involvement of Pakistan-based or trained terrorists in the deteriorating situation in Saudi Arabia and Iraq, in the explosions in Istanbul, increased US pressure on it to act more firmly against terrorists operating from its territory and the expression of Chinese concerns over the training of Uighur terrorists in Pakistani territory during Musharraf's recent visit to China. In a candid discussion with senior Pakistani journalists on November 20, 2003, Musharraf was reported to have expressed his concern over the increasing negative perception of Pakistan abroad. The Islamabad-based correspondent of "The Hindu", the prestigious daily of Chennai, reported as follows on November 23: " Musharraf has surprised observers here with his candid comment that with the passage of time, the world has started suspecting Pakistan's sincerity in supporting the war on terrorism....Musharraf said perception that he himself was supporting extremists and terrorists was gaining widespread acceptance in the world....He warned that Pakistan will suffer from sanctions and "they may even start bombing our tribal areas" if this perception is not removed urgently...Musharraf said he was shocked, when during his recent visit to China, that country's leaders informed him that Pakistan had provided sanctuary to Chinese extremists operating against Beijing's interests." The Pakistani move for a more positive approach towards India came three days after it suffered a major diplomatic set-back in the UN General Assembly when a majority of the members abstained or absented themselves during the voting (November 20) on a resolution calling for the respect of the principle of the right of self-determination of people. It has been on the basis of this principle that Pakistan has been claiming J&K and moving a resolution on the subject every year in the General Assembly, which used to be passed by consensus. This year, India, sensing a change in the mood of the international community on this issue, insisted on a vote on the Pakistani resolution and the desertion from its ranks of many countries, which had supported Pakistan in the past, came as rude shock to Islamabad. These countries have started realising that Pakistan has been using this principle of the right of self-determination as a cover for its use of terrorism against India under the pretext of a so-called freedom struggle. The prestigious "Friday Times" of Lahore (November 24) quoted an unidentified Pakistani diplomat as stating as follows: " I feel deeply disturbed at this development because it has weakened the moral weight of a concept that Pakistan has always used in support of its position on Kashmir.” Indo-Pakistan relations have seen many ups and downs in the past due to exaggerated hopes and unwarranted euphoria, which were ultimately belied. India should, therefore, guard itself against a repetition of this syndrome even while being cautiously receptive to any positive moves from Pakistan. (The writer is Additional Secretary (Retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Convenor, Advisory Committee, Observer Research Foundation (ORF), Chennai Chapter.) |
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