J&K: The Hurriyat Splits

J&K: The Hurriyat Splits
Kanchan Lakshman
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management; Assistant Editor, Faultlines: Writings on Conflict & Resolution

Internal fissures within All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC), the main overground secessionist syndicate in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), culminated in a formal split on September 7, 2003, with at least 12 of its 25 constituents 'removing' Chairman Maulana Mohammad Abbas Ansari and 'replacing' him with Massarat Alam as its interim chief. The dissenters reportedly met at the residence of hardliner and pro-Pakistan Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) leader Syed Ali Shah Geelani and decided to depose Ansari and 'suspend' the seven-member executive committee, the highest decision-making forum of the APHC. A five-member committee has been formed to review the Hurriyat's constitution and suggest amendments to reverse what the dissenters perceive as 'autocratic' decisions taken by the executive committee.

The schism is a culmination of the war of attrition between the 'moderate' faction led by Ansari and the hard line group led by Geelani, with the latter seen as implacably committed to a pro-Pakistan position. Geelani, in recent times, has campaigned for the expulsion of the pro-dialogue Jammu and Kashmir People's Conference (JKPC) from the Hurriyat. JKPC leader Abdul Gani Lone had been assassinated by two unidentified terrorists at the Eidgah grounds in Srinagar on May 21, 2002. Some JKPC leaders later participated in the State Legislative Assembly elections held in September-October 2002 although Lone's son, Sajjad Lone, has consistently maintained that those who contested the elections were doing so 'in their own capacity' and not with the party's accredition. The issue also led to the JeI's removal of Geelani as its representative in the APHC executive council in May 2003, when he was replaced with Sheikh Ali Mohammad. During his campaign, Geelani had denounced the Hurriyat leadership for failing to provide a direction to the 'freedom struggle' in J&K.

An alliance of 25 socio-political and religious organisations, the APHC was formed in March 1993 as a political front to further the cause of Kashmiri separatism. The umbrella group has been consistently promoted by Pakistan in its quest to secure legitimacy for its territorial claims on J&K. Hurriyat's origins are traced back to the 1993 phase of the Kashmir insurgency, when the initial euphoria of the armed struggle against Indian security forces had subsided in the face of counter-terrorist operations. The Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), with its pro-independence ideology, had been marginalised and was being replaced by a network of Islamist terrorist groups sponsored and controlled by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) at this stage. In a parallel development, Pakistan facilitated the creation of the Hurriyat as an umbrella body for all over-ground secessionist organisations. Since the international community frowned upon the resort to violence by non-state actors, the Hurriyat was projected as a 'legitimate' platform to promote the Kashmiri secessionist cause.

The Hurriyat has long been plagued with dissension from within. For one, there are clearly defined 'hawk' and 'dove' factions, with leaders like Geelani overtly supporting terrorist violence, particularly of those outfits which espouse an orthodox Islamist future for the State. In contrast, constituents such as the JKLF have renounced violence as part of their agenda. The issue of a possible future for the State outside Indian sovereignty has also generated an internal divide, with Geelani and others openly espousing J&K's accession to Pakistan, while the JKLF demands an independent state. The issue of foreign mercenaries and Pakistan-based groups that operate without any indigenous membership or leadership has created controversies within the organization. While dissension within the Hurriyat has been fought out in public under the façade of ideological disputes, individual ego clashes are invariably visible in the conflicting statements of warring leaders. The election for the Chairman in year 2000 heightened these personality clashes, and these have continued to simmer till date, with Geelani and the People's Conference emerging as the main protagonists. On issues, the two have clashed over the role of foreign mercenaries and over character of the conflict in the State, with the latter terming it as a political issue and Geelani calling it a 'religious issue'. The Hurriyat's claim to be the 'sole representative' of the Kashmiris has, so far, been explicitly endorsed only by Pakistan.

While the scuffle between the two factions as to who constitutes the real Hurriyat can be expected to continue, the Geelani faction will almost certainly secure the support, both of Pakistan, and of various Pakistan-based terrorist groups. Geelani has long enjoyed the unequivocal support of the Pakistan-backed terrorist groups, including the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM) and Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen (JuM), and this is crucial. On May 27, 2003, the Pakistani paper, The News, quoted Hizb spokesperson Salim Hashmi: "The Hizb is filled with dismay over the removal of Geelani from the APHC… Attempts to sideline Geelani from the Hurriyat will not only badly affect the goodwill of the alliance but also help India accomplish its plans to de-track (sic) the liberation movement." Hashmi said that during a 'command council' meeting held at Muzaffarabad in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK), to discuss Geelani's replacement within the Hurriyat, Hizb 'commanders' had said that his "fearless and enthusiastic leadership enjoyed complete trust" of both Kashmiris and militants "engaged in the battlefield to overthrow Indian occupation." The JuM claimed that Geelani had been sidelined by the Hurriyat and the Jamaat-e-Islami "to win the goodwill of Indian and American leadership". Further, the Lashkar while praising Geelani's "principled stand", appealed to the Kashmiris to support him. The United Jehad Council (UJC), a conglomerate of 13 Pakistan-based terrorist outfits, in a press release from Muzaffarabad on May 26, 2003, had described Geelani as 'a staunch leader' who could neither be cowed down nor purchased by any agency. It asked the Hurriyat to address Geelani's complaints against the People's Conference, endorse his "principled and constitutional stand" and take him back in its fold. Similarly, the Muzaffarabad-based 'supreme commander' of the Hizbul Momineen, Syed Aijaz Rizvi, said that Jamaat-e-Islami had actually "committed treason with the blood of martyrs" and adopted a "hypocritical approach" in retreating from Jehad.

The schism within the Hurriyat, howsoever important it may be in the current political dynamic in J&K, is, however, not the crucial issue. The real question will be about the occupation of the secessionist space in the State, which was hitherto dominated by the Hurriyat - factional squabbles notwithstanding. Geelani was at the centerstage of this political platform, and had long argued the position that terrorist violence had given much-needed leverage to the 'freedom struggle' of the Kashmiris. He also consistently held that J&K was an integral part of Pakistan, and that India had forcibly occupied the territory. Ironically, Geelani earns a pension for his tenure as a Member of the State Legislative Assembly, which he entered after swearing allegiance to the Indian Constitution. On the other hand, the 'moderates' led by Maulana Abbas Ansari more accurately reflect the mood and inclinations of a majority of the people of Kashmir today, with a growing popular resentment against Pakistan-backed terrorists and mercenaries in the State. Nevertheless, with the Pakistan-based groups throwing their weight - and the coercive force of terrorist violence - behind Geelani, there are fears that the moderates will be systematically marginalized or, eventually, eliminated, from the secessionist political space they currently occupy.

Courtesy: South Asia Terrorism Portal