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Footprints of Terror
Ajai Sahni
Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute for Conflict Management
On March 1, 2003, Khalid Sheikh
Mohammad, one of the prime planners of the
9/11
attacks on the US, was arrested in Rawalpindi. The US authorities had been
pursuing him at least since his 1995 involvement in the abortive 'Operation
Bojinka' conspiracy to simultaneously blow up 12 American civilian airliners
over the Pacific, in which he collaborated with his relative, Ramzi Yousef, who
is currently serving a life sentence in America for the 1993 attack on the World
Trade Centre. With a US $ 25 million reward on his head, this self proclaimed
'head of
Al Qaeda's
Military Committee' and close associate of
Osama bin
Laden is certainly a major catch for the
Americans. Within the context of the global war against terror, however, this is
just another very small step forward.
To understand why, it is useful to look at some other incidents over the past
weeks in Pakistan. On February 28, in the latest in a long series of sectarian
killings, three persons from the minority Shia community were killed by
unidentified attackers in Karachi. On the same day, two policemen guarding the
American Consulate in Karachi were killed, when an unidentified gunman opened
fire on the police picket near the consulate building. Five other police
personnel and a civilian passer-by were also injured in this incident. On
February 22, nine persons from the minority Shia community, including a seven
year old boy, were killed, and seven others wounded by three motorcycle borne
gunmen outside an Imambargah (mosque) in Karachi. On February 16, former
legislator and Muttahida Quomi Mahaz - Altaf Hussain (MQM-A)
central leader Khalid bin Waleed was shot dead and his associate and official
gunman injured, again in Karachi.
Sheikh Mohammad's arrest has integral links with these acts of terror, and the
organisations that executed them. One of the primary organisations responsible
for the targeted killings of minority groups and their leaders in Karachi is the
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ),
and it was after two members of this group were arrested and interrogated on
information provided by some Shias from Gilgit in the Northern Areas that
another LeJ terrorist was traced out in Quetta. It was this third LeJ operative
who eventually disclosed that Sheikh Mohammad had been hiding out with him, but
had escaped just before the raid. It was on his information that the residence
of Ahmed Abdul Qadoos was raided in Rawalpindi, and Sheikh Mohammad was
arrested. Sheikh Mohammad has had an extended association with the LeJ.
Sheikh Mohammad's arrest, the succession of sectarian killings in Karachi, and
the attacks on the US consulate are renewed evidence that terrorism is alive and
well in Pakistan. These events need to be placed in the context of President
Musharraf's rather strident denials of Al Qaeda presence in the country, and
claims that terrorists were not being allowed to operate from Pakistani soil.
Sheikh Mohammad's arrest, indeed, validates assertions that the Al Qaeda has
substantially regrouped and relocated in Pakistan, and has been facilitated in
this by a number of political and militant actors closely linked to state
agencies. The arrest of Ahmed Abdul Qadoos, who is the son of a local
Jamaat-e-Islami leader, and his quick defence by the Jamaat, bears this pattern
out. The Jamaat is a major political force in the present establishment, and has
long been an inspiration for a number of extremist militant affiliates.
President Musharraf's showcase arrests of the leaders of banned terrorist
groups, their subsequent release, and the continued operation of these groups
under new names needs to be immediately revaluated, and pressure must be brought
to bear on Pakistan to place effective curbs on the operation of these groups
and connected individuals. It should be noted here that virtually all the groups
supposedly 'banned' by Pakistan as terrorist organisations are now allowed to
function with impunity under new names. Thus, for example, the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT)
now operates as the 'Pasban-e-Ahle-Hadith'; the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM)
is 'Al Furqan'; the Markaz-ad-Dawa-wal-Irsahd is 'Jamaat-ad-Dawa'; the
Tehrik-e-Jafaria Pakistan (TJP)
is the 'Tehrik-e-Islami'. Within the current circumstances in Pakistan,
consequently, where the state actively tolerates, or even encourages and
supports, certain patterns of terrorism, it is not possible to effectively
control others. There is an ethos of terrorism, and this has enormously
facilitated the relocation of the Al Qaeda in this country. It is useful to
notice, also, that the footprints of virtually every major act of international
terrorism in the world in recent years pass inevitably through this country, and
it is precisely this 'ethos of terrorism' that makes it the crucial link in the
inexorable growth of global terror.
There are many who believe that Sheikh Mohammad's arrest constitutes a 'major
blow' to bin Laden and the Al Qaeda. At one level, this is certainly the case:
the loss of a top operative inevitably inflicts some damage on the operational
capabilities of an organisation. But such losses are far from crippling - as the
death of Mohammad Atef and the arrests of Abu Zubaidah and Ramzi Binalshibh have
already demonstrated. Indeed, with the tens of thousands who have been trained
by the Taliban - Al Qaeda - Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) combine in camps
along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border for over a decade, the 'sacrifice' of a
few operatives is not only easily absorbed, it is a necessary input in the
development of the organisation.
The fact is, the Al Qaeda and the Islamist terrorist Internationale has
immensely evolved since 9/11. A continuing succession of terrorist strikes,
including a string of incidents in Pakistan, the attacks in Bali and Mombasa, as
well as continuous pre-emptive arrests across Europe and America are testimony
to the crystallization of a truly decentralized, hydra-headed operation which
will continue to flourish as long as it retains its seeding grounds and safe
havens in nation states where the culture of violence and the ideologies of
terror are supported by the state structure and a powerful social and political
establishment.
Courtesy:
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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