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BOOK REVIEW
A History of
Helping the Displaced
By Sreeram Chaulia
(A Review of
Gil Loescher's
'The UNHCR and World
Politics: A Perilous Path')
Gil
Loescher can lay claim to the honor of writing the first definitive
history of the world's premier refugee organization, the Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Moreover, it is
history with a difference. Instead of merely recording the past,
UNHCR and World Politics also launches into a critical prescriptive
analysis for the future of the organization that was originally meant to
be an ad hoc answer to a temporary malaise affecting post-World War II
European refugees.
It is at one level the story of how a UN agency perpetuated itself to
remain in existence as long as there is violent conflict in a world
between nation-states, and at another level a highly opinionated
discourse on what has been wrong with the UNHCR and how amends can be
made to make it more responsive and effective to its constituency of
nearly 20 million refugees and other people of concern.
Loescher, a 20-year veteran of refugee studies who has worked in the
corridors of UNHCR, has a prolegomenon-cum-justification for authoring
this book: Lack of cogent institutional memory is a serious lacuna in
the organization, and Loescher hopes that this journey down memory lane
will help instill a sense of the policy evolution and direction, and
political constraints that have governed the Office in the last 50
years. Being an intergovernmental organization, UNHCR maintains a
"perilous balance between the protection of refugees and the sovereign
prerogatives and interests of states", by projecting refugee rights
norms into a system dominated by concerns of national interest and
security. The extent to which powerful states dictate to UNHCR and the
extent to which successive high commissioners have skillfully manuevered
to maintain independence within limits is the leitmotif of the book.
Cold War origins under Goedhart (1951-56)
UNHCR's early freedom was circumscribed by Cold War politics. The
USSR accused the organization of acting as a cover for the Western bloc
to engineer defections and plant spies in Eastern Europe, and
subsequently boycotted it. The deliberation and drafting of the 1951
Refugees Convention were conducted solely by Western powers and
non-communist member states of the UN. The convention "was intended to
be used by the Western states in dealing with arrivals from the East,
and largely reflected the international politics of the period". (p 45)
Ironically, the US government remained opposed to the UNHCR in its first
few years, beginning with the defeat of the American candidate for the
post of high commissioner. Washington funded rival organizations and
treated UNHCR as a "sideshow and a mostly irrelevant organization".
The tide turned by 1955, with the Nobel Peace Prize awarded to UNHCR and
American representatives assuming active roles in UNHCR's executive
committee. Soviet attempts at "re-defection" of refugees in Austria also
raised US funding for UNHCR's local integration solution.
Independence and expansion under Lindt and
Schnyder (1956-65)
Under Swiss diplomat Auguste Lindt, "UNHCR's orientation became
clearly pro-American". (p 81) US government financial and diplomatic
backing of UNHCR operations rose to great heights during the Soviet
invasion of Hungary, when the international community specifically
designated UNHCR as the "lead agency" to oversee a large-scale
humanitarian emergency. Simultaneously, Lindt displayed independent
action by persuading Western states that the repatriation of Hungarian
minors in the interests of family unity must take precedence over Cold
War calculations; this action earned the respect of the socialist
governments of Yugoslavia and Hungary.
At the turn of the decade, the US identified some refugee programs
outside Europe as affecting its strategic interests by being sources of
possible communist subversion and "encouraged the High Commissioner's
office to get involved in these situations". (p 91) UNHCR "good offices"
were used to mount big operations for Chinese refugees in Hong Kong and
Tibetans in India, setting precedents for UNHCR intervention in refugee
assistance throughout the developing world.
In the 1960s, UNHCR increased its range of services in Africa, gaining
the trust and dependence of newly independent countries on the
continent. Under Felix Schnyder (another Swiss diplomat), UNHCR changed
the approach of assistance by providing reintegration and reconstruction
assistance to returnees in Algeria. Lindt favored material assistance
over legal protection in terms of UNHCR priorities, leading some
protection advisers in the organization to complain that "most African
countries sought UNHCR involvement only for the money". (p 119)
More visionary than the previous two high commissioners, Schnyder
expanded the "good offices" concept with missionary zeal, taking the
plunge into uncharted waters like non-mandate Laotian refugees in
Cambodia, rural resettlement programs in southern Africa, and acting as
a "drop of oil" that would attract other specialized UN agencies to
refugee development.
He also allowed UNHCR to be used as "the perfect cover for US
policymakers" in the Sudan, where Washington was mindful of not
upsetting the government by aiding refugees emerging from the south of
the country. Likewise, "well aware of its limited resources and mindful
of following a policy that would put it in conflict with a major power",
Schnyder took no action in the Cuban asylum crisis. (p 133)
The golden era under Aga Khan (1965-77)
Under the Iranian Sadruddin Aga Khan, UNHCR "shed its image of being a
tool of the United States and gained credibility as an independent
global actor". (p 141) His election was opposed by the Americans on
grounds that he was "Afro-Asian oriented" and would neglect the Cold War
escapees in Europe. True to prediction, Sadruddin creatively extended
UNHCR's mandate to Sudanese in "refugee-like situations", ie, returnees
and internally displaced persons (IDPs), while staying away from
sensitive IDP cases like Indonesia and Nigeria.
From a lead agency, UNHCR moved to becoming the "focal point" in the
gargantuan Bangladesh operation, coordinating the United Nations
Children's Fund (UNICEF), the World Health Organization (WHO), the World
Food Program (WFP) and a bevy of non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
When Idi Amin expelled Asians from Uganda in 1972 or when Pinochet's
terror machine created Brazilian and Argentinian refugees, Sadruddin was
careful to maintain good working relations with the governments and at
no time did he publicly condemn their inhuman actions, again drawing
protests that legal protection and human rights were being sidelined by
UNHCR. "Reluctance to criticize governments for their human rights
policies remained a cornerstone of UNHCR policy until the 1990s." (p
175)
Problems galore under Hartling (1977-85)
Danish politician Poul Hartling, the new high commissioner, "did not
maintain a healthy independence from the United States, unlike Sadruddin".
(p 202) The bargain for losing freedom was a quintupling of the UNHCR's
budget from Western states, and thanks to ample donor funding, even
greater priority was given to material aid and physical care rather than
protection.
While forcefully arguing on behalf of Vietnamese boat people fleeing the
communist regime, Hartling was non-vocal about the genocide committed by
the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia and the massive rejection of Cambodians by
Thailand and Rohingyas by Burma in 1978-79 (both Cambodia and Thailand
were US allies at the time).
Civil wars fought under the banner of the "Second Cold War" in
Afghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua, etc, led to the new problem of refugee
camp militarization, with internal UNHCR reports lamenting that
"humanitarian aid actually contributed to prolonging conflict", but no
action was taken to remedy this dilemma that would continue into the
1990s. Widespread proscription and rights abuses that took place in
Afghan camps in Pakistan were ignored and left to the excesses of
fundamentalist Islam and Western interests.
Touching rock bottom under Hocke and
Stoltenberg (1986-91)
Upset that UNHCR might be veering towards a "legalistic" approach, the
US campaigned for a new "operational" high commissioner, Jean-Pierre
Hocke, the Swiss ICRC official. However, Hocke's term "tore apart the
UNHCR, drastically lowered morale, and subjected the Office to
international humiliation". (p 249)
Downgrading of the UNHCR's legal culture reached its nadir, leading NGOs
and many UNHCR personnel to complain that the new-look organization had
"lost its soul". Hocke's promotion of repatriation as the "only viable
solution" even in conflict zones, using subtle coercion and
misinformation on refugees, was widely resented within and outside. The
only significant achievement of Hocke was to anticipate the end of the
Cold War and negotiate the entry of countries from the Eastern bloc to
sign on to the 1951 Convention and join UNHCR.
Several financial crises overtook Hocke's last years, muddled by
allegations of personal corruption and declining Western contributions.
His pro tempore replacement, Norwegian Thorvald Stoltenberg, improved
the Office's relations with donors in the executive committee, and
during his short tenure he also suggested policy shifts toward helping
governments transport non-refugees back home and preventing future
migration flows.
New challenges under Ogata (1991-2000)
Sadako Ogata, the Japanese professor and diplomat, "proved to be an
enterprising entrepreneur and showed a sophisticated awareness of the
political opportunity structures within which the UNHCR operated". (p
273) As the ultimate "practical HC", she did not believe in lecturing
governments or directly accusing them of improper behavior. The end of
the Cold War pushed her to assume the role of "teacher of refugee norms"
in Russia and the former Soviet states, furthering the reach of the
international refugee regime.
Voluntary repatriations were successfully carried out to Cambodia and
Mozambique, even though the law was diluted to read that UNHCR would
encourage returns if conditions in home countries improved
"appreciably", not the original "substantially". A structure of
emergency response teams was introduced in UNHCR to pre-position for
imminent displacement crises, and public information and visibility of
the organization in visual and print media was sharpened (Time magazine,
for example, invented the phrase "Ogata's Angels" for UNHCR staff
working in difficult conditions).
Ogata also opened internal and UN-wide debates on preemptive action,
such as not waiting for refugees to cross borders before taking action.
"Preventive protection" failed in Bosnia and barely succeeded in
southern Somalia. As one writes, clarity and predictability of UNHCR
response to IDP flows are still prisoner to state stipulations and
inter-agency politics.
The post-genocide refugee explosion from Rwanda and militarization of
camps were colossal failures that "constituted a dereliction of
responsibility and moral negligence" of the Office. (p 313) UNHCR
advocacy for asylum-seekers in "Fortress Europe" was also minimal, with
Ogata not keen on losing regained confidence of donors by upsetting
them. American and Australian detention centers for asylum applicants
also went unaddressed by UNHCR.
The subservience of protection to operations received a coup de grace
with the internal restructuring of Project Delphi. Close cooperation
between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and UNHCR in Albania and
Macedonia after the Kosovo war also attracted widespread condemnation as
compromising the impartiality and independence of the Office. Russian
policies in Chechnya were not criticized although they caused immense
hardships and displacement. African refugees also passed below the radar
of UNHCR attention.
Conclusion
Loescher's main deduction from the evolutionary history of UNHCR is that
the imbalance between protection and material operations threatens the
raison d'etre of the Office and should be promptly redressed. Though the
Office is a "highly political actor clearly shaped by the interests of
major governments", it must show "courage and a willingness to confront
governments when necessary". (p 367)
UNHCR's "culture of defensiveness" that impedes learning, debate and
innovation are also areas for change. Loescher alleges that UNHCR is
unaccountable to its constituency, refugees, as is evident in numerous
contrived repatriation policies. Bureaucratic mentality is blamed for
this undemocratic trait, though Loescher has no concrete suggestions on
how refugees can be made more participative in policymaking. He also
dwells upon the financial crunch but lacks recommendations on broadening
private sector partnerships or other innovative methods to ensure a
steady flow of income to the organization.
Last but not least, Loescher advises UNHCR to practice "listening and
taking in the views of others and not just pronouncing its own positions
and opinions". (p 376) From this author's recent stint at UNHCR, it is
evident that openness to scholarly and external views is slowly gaining
ground, though it is difficult to predict whether any "Lessons Learned"
are being imbibed in the process.
A complete book in many senses, Loescher could have renamed it A US-UNHCR
Saga, a la Boutros Ghali's controversial memoir. For an intimate
account of American stewardship, influence and leverage on a UN body,
read this book.
(The UNHCR
and World Politics: A Perilous Path, by Gil Loescher. Oxford
University Press, 2001. ISBN 0-19-924691-2. Price US$21.95. 431 Pages)
[Sreeram
Sundar Chaulia studied History at St.Stephen’s College, Delhi, and took
a Second BA in Modern History at University College, Oxford. He
researched the BJP’s foreign policy at the London School of Economics
and is currently analyzing the impact of conflict on Afghan refugees at
the Maxwell School of Citizenship, Syracuse, NY.] |
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